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Abstract—Recently, a number of approaches and techniques
have been introduced for reporting software statistics with strong
privacy guarantees, spurred by the large-scale deployment of
mechanisms such as Google’s RAPPOR [1].
Ranging from abstract algorithms to comprehensive systems,
and varying in their assumptions and applicability, this work
has built upon local differential privacy mechanisms, sometimes
augmented by anonymity. Most recently, based on the Encode,
Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) framework [2], a notable set of results
has formally clarified how making reports anonymous can
greatly improve privacy guarantees without loss of utility [3],
[4]. Unfortunately, these results have comprised either systems
with seemingly incomparable mechanisms and attack models, or
formal statements that have given little guidance to practitioners.
To address this, in this work we provide a formal treatment
and offer prescriptive guidelines for privacy-preserving reporting
with anonymity, i.e., for deployments of “privacy amplification
by shuffling.” To achieve this, we revisit the ESA framework
and craft a simple, abstract model of attackers and assumptions
covering it and other proposed systems of anonymity. In light
of the new formal privacy bounds, we examine the limitations
of sketch-based encodings and ESA mechanisms such as data-
dependent crowds. However, we also demonstrate how the ESA
notion of fragmentation—i.e., reporting different data aspects
in separate, unlinkable messages—is essential for improving
the privacy/utility tradeoff both in terms of local and central
differential-privacy guarantees.
Finally, to help practitioners understand the applicability and
limitations of privacy-preserving reporting, we report on a large
number of empirical experiments. In these, we mostly use real-
world datasets with heavy-tailed or near-flat distributions, since
these pose the greatest difficulty for our techniques; in particular,
we focus on data drawn from images, since it can be easily
visualized in a way that highlights errors in its reconstruction.
Showing the promise of the approach, and of independent in-
terest, we also report on experiments using anonymous, privacy-
preserving reporting to train high-accuracy deep neural networks
on standard tasks, such as MNIST and CIFAR-10.
I. INTRODUCTION
To guide their efforts, public health officials must sometimes
gather statistics based on sensitive, private information (e.g.,
to survey the prevalence of vaping among middle-school
children). Due to privacy concerns—or simple reluctance to
admit the truth—respondents may fail to answer such surveys,
or purposefully answer incorrectly, despite the societal benefits
of improved public-health measures.
To remove such discouragement, and still compute accurate
statistics, epidemiologists can turn to randomized response
† Work done while at Google Brain.
Fig. 1: A differentially-private view of the NYC smartphone-
location data published by the New York Times in 2018 [5].
Anonymous, randomized location reports allow high accuracy
with a strong central differential privacy guarantee (εc = 0.5)
and a weaker local guarantee (ε`∞ ≈ 12) that still provides un-
certainty even if all parties collude and break report anonymity.
and have respondents not report their true answer, but instead
report the results of random coin flips that are just biased by
that true answer [6].
In computing, such randomized-response mechanisms that
guarantee local differential privacy (LDP) have become a
widely-deployed, best-practice means of gathering potentially-
sensitive information about software and its users in a respon-
sible manner [1], [7]. Simultaneously, many systems have been
developed for anonymous communication and messaging [8],
[9], many of which are designed to gather aggregate statistics
with privacy [2], [10], [11], [12]. As shown in Figure 1,
when combined with anonymity, LDP reports can permit
high-accuracy central visibility into distributed, sensitive data
(e.g., different users’ private attributes) with strong worst-
case privacy guarantees that hold for even the most un-
lucky respondents—even when fate and other parties conspire
against them. Thereby, a key dilemma can be resolved: how
to usefully learn about a population’s data distribution without
collecting distinct, identifiable population data into a database
whose very existence forms an unbounded privacy risk, espe-
cially as it may be abused for surveillance.
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A. Statistical Reporting with Privacy, in Practice
Unfortunately, in practice, there remains little clarity on how
statistical reporting should be implemented and deployed with
strong privacy guarantees—especially if LDP reports are to
be made anonymous [2], [3], [13], [14]. A daunting number
of LDP reporting protocols have been recently proposed and
formally analyzed, each using slightly different assumptions
and techniques, such as strategies for randomization and
encoding of binary, categorical, and other types of data [1],
[15], [16], [17]. However, these protocols may not be suitable
to the specifics of any given application domain, due to
their different assumptions, (e.g., about adaptivity [3], [14],
sketching [1], [18], [15], [16], or succinctness of communi-
cation [15], [16], [19]). Thus, these protocols may exhibit
lackluster performance on real-world data distributions of
limited size, even when accompanied by a formal proof of
asymptotically-optimal privacy/utility tradeoffs. In particular,
many of these protocols perform dimensionality-reduction
using sketches whose added noise may greatly thwart visibility
into the tail of distributions (as shown in the experiments
of Section VII). Finally, the option of simply replicating the
details of prominent LDP-reporting deployments is not very
attractive, since these have been criticized both for a lack of
privacy and a lack of utility [1], [2], [20].
Similarly, multiple, disparate approaches have been devel-
oped for ensuring anonymity, including some comprehensive
systems that have seen wide deployment [8]. However, most
of these are not well suited to gathering statistics with strong
privacy, as they are focused on low-latency communication or
point-to-point messaging [8], [9], [21]. The few that are well-
suited to ensuring the anonymity of long-term, high-latency
statistical reporting are somewhat incomparable, due to their
different technical mechanisms and their varying assumptions
and threat models. Whether they rely on Tor-like mixnets or
trusted hardware, some proposed systems output sets of reports
unlinkable to their origin [2], [13], while others output only
a summary of the reports made anonymous by the use of
a commutative, associative aggregation operation [10], [11].
Also, these systems’ abilities are constrained by the specifics
of their construction and mechanisms (e.g., built-in sampling
rates and means of multi-party cryptographic computation, as
in [11]); some systems are more specific still, and focus only
on certain applications, such as the maintenance of (statistical)
models [12], [22]. Finally, all of these systems have slightly
different threat models, e.g., with some assuming an honest-
but-curious central coordinator [11] and other assuming a non-
colluding, trusted set of parties [2], [10]. (Interestingly, these
threat models typically exclude the risk of statistical inference,
even though limiting this risk is often a primary privacy goal,
as it is in this paper.) All of this tends to obscure how these
anonymity systems can be best applied to learning statistics
with strong privacy guarantees.
This lack of clarity is especially concerning because of
recent formal results—known colloquially as “privacy am-
plification by shuffling” [3], [13], [14], [19]—which have
fundamentally changed privacy/utility tradeoffs and forced a
reconsideration of previous approaches, like those described
above. These amplification results prove how central privacy
guarantees can be strengthened by orders of magnitude when
LDP reports can be made anonymous—i.e., unlinkable to their
source—in particular, by having them get “lost in the crowd”
through their shuffling or aggregate summarization with a
sufficiently-large set of other reports.
The source of these privacy amplification results are efforts
to formalize how LDP reporting mechanisms benefit from
anonymity in the Encode, Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) frame-
work [2]. The ESA architecture is rather abstract—placing few
restrictions on specifics such as randomization schemes, report
encoding, or the means of establishing anonymity—and, not
surprisingly, can be a suitable foundation for implementations
that aim to benefit from privacy amplification by anonymity.
B. Practical Experiments, Primitives, and Attack Models
In this work, we revisit the specifics of the ESA framework
and explore statistical reporting with strong privacy guarantees
augmented by anonymity, with the goal of providing clear,
practical implementation guidelines.
At the center of this paper are a set of empirical experi-
ments, modeled on real-world monitoring tasks, that achieve
different levels of privacy on a representative set of data distri-
butions. For most of our experiments we use data distributions
derived from images, which we choose because they are both
representative of certain sensitive data—such as user-location
data, as in Figure 1—and their reconstruction accuracy can be
easily estimated, visually. Reconstructing images with strong
privacy is particularly challenging since images are a naturally
high-dimensional dataset with a low maximum amplitude (e.g.,
the per-pixel distribution of an 8-bit gray-scale image will have
a luminescence bound of 255), and which can be either dense
or sparse. In addition, following most previous work, we also
include experiments that use a real-world, Zipfian dataset with
high-amplitude heavy hitters.
The overall conclusion of this paper is that high-accuracy
statistical reporting with strong, anonymity-amplified privacy
guarantees can be implemented using a small set of simple
primitives: (i) a new “removal” basis for the analysis of
LDP reporting, (ii) one-hot encoding of categorical data, (iii)
fragmenting of data and reports into multiple messages, and
(iv) anonymous shuffling or aggregate sums. Although novel
in combination, most of these individual primitives have been
explored in previous work; the exception is our “removal
LDP” report definition which can strengthen the local privacy
guarantees by a factor of two. For several common statistical
reporting tasks, we argue that these four primitives are difficult
to improve upon, and we verify this in experiments.
Interestingly, we find that some of the more advanced
primitives from the related work may offer little benefits and
can, in some cases, be detrimental to privacy and utility. These
include ESA’s Crowd IDs and the heterogeneous privacy levels
they induce, by identifying subsets of reports, as well as—
most surprisingly—the use of the sketch-based encodings like
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those popularized by RAPPOR [1], [16]. As we shown in
experiments, while sketching will always reduce the number
of sent reports, sketching may add noise that greatly exceeds
that required for privacy, unless the sketch construction is fine-
tuned to the target data-distribution specifics.
However, we find great benefits in the ESA concept of
fragments: breaking up the information to be reported and
leveraging anonymity to send multiple unlinkable reports,
instead of sending the same information in just one report.
As an example, using attribute fragmentation, a respondent
with different attributes encoded into a long, sparse Boolean
bitvector can send multiple, separately-anonymous reports for
the index of each bit set in an LDP version of the bitvector.
In particular, we show how privacy/utility tradeoffs can be
greatly improved by applying such attribute fragmentation
to LDP reports based on one-hot encodings of categorical
data. Another useful form is report fragmentation, where
respondents send multiple, re-randomized reports based on an
LDP backstop (e.g., an underlying, permanent LDP report,
like the PRR of [1]); this can allow for a more refined attack
model and lower the per-report privacy risk, while maintaining
a strict cap on the overall, long-term privacy loss.
Finally, we propose a simple, abstract model of threats and
assumptions that abstracts away from the how shuffling is
performed and assumes only that LDP report anonymization
satisfy a few, clear requirements; thereby, we hope to help
practitioners reason about and choose from the disparate
set of anonymization systems, both current and future. The
requirements of our attack model can be met using a variety
of mechanisms, such as mixnets, anonymous messaging, or
a variety of cryptographic multi-party mechanisms including
ESA’s “blinded shuffling” [2]. Furthermore, while simple, our
attack model still allows for refinements—such as efficient
in-system aggregation of summaries, and gradual loss of
privacy due to partial compromise or collusion—which may
be necessary for practical, real-world deployments.
C. Summary of Contributions
This paper gives clear guidelines for how practitioners
can implement high-accuracy statistical reporting with strong
privacy guarantees—even for difficult, high-dimensional data
distributions, and as little as a few dozen respondents—and
best leverage recent privacy-amplification results based on
anonymity. In particular, this paper contributes the following:
§II We explain how the reports in anonymous statistical
monitoring are well suited to a “removal LDP” definition
of local differential privacy and how this can strengthen
respondents’ local privacy guarantees by a factor of two,
without compromise.
§VII We give the results of numerous experiments that are
representative of real-world tasks and data distributions
and show that strong central privacy guarantees are
compatible with high utility—even for low-amplitude and
long-tail distributions—but that this requires high-epsilon
LDP reports and, correspondingly, great trust in how
reports are anonymized.
§V We clarify how—given the strong central privacy guar-
antees allowed by anonymity—the use of higher-epsilon
LDP reports is almost always preferable to mechanisms,
like ESA Crowd IDs, which perform data-dependent
grouping of reports during anonymization.
§III We outline how privacy and utility can be maximized by
having respondents use attribute fragmentation to break
up their data (such as the different bits of their reports)
and send as separate, unlinkable LDP reports.
§IV We formally analyze how—along the lines of RAPPOR’s
permanent randomized response [1]—report fragmenta-
tion can reduce the per-report privacy risk, while strictly
bounding the overall, long-term privacy loss.
§VII We empirically show the advantages of simple one-
hot LDP report encodings and—as a warning to
practitioners—empirically highlight the need to fine-tune
the parameters of sketch-based encodings.
§II We provide a simple, abstract attack model that makes it
easier to reason about the assumptions and specifics of
anonymity mechanisms and LDP reporting schemes, and
compose them into practical systems.
§VII Finally, we demonstrate how anonymous LDP reports can
be usefully applied to the training of benchmark deep
learning models with high accuracy, with clear central
privacy guarantees and minimal empirical loss of privacy.
II. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We first lay a foundation for the remainder of this paper
by defining notation, terms, and stating clear assumptions. In
particular, we clarify what we mean by LDP reports, their
encoding and fragmentation, as well as our model of attackers
and anonymization.
A. Local Differential Privacy and Removal vs. Replacement
Differential privacy (DP), introduced by Dwork et al. [23],
[24], is a privacy definition that captures how randomized
algorithms that operate on a dataset can be bounded in
their sensitivity to the presence or absence of any particular
data item. Differential privacy is measured as the maximum
possible divergence between the output distributions of such
algorithms when applied to two datasets that differ by any one
record. The most common definition of this metric is based
on the worst-case replacement of any dataset record:
Definition II.1 (Replacement (ε, δ)-DP [25]). A random-
ized algorithm M : Dn → S satisfies replacement (ε, δ)-
differential privacy if for all S ⊂ S and for all i ∈ [n] and
datasets D = (x1, . . . , xn), D′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n) ∈ Dn such
that xj = x′j for all j 6= i we have:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
Above, as in the rest of this paper, we let [n] denote the set
of integers {1, . . . , n}, [a, b] denote {v : a ≤ v ≤ b}, and
(a∧b) denote max(a, b). Symbols such as x typically represent
scalars, symbols such as x represent vectors of appropriate
length. Elements of x are represented by xi. Respectively,
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‖x‖1 and ‖x‖2 represent
∑ |xi| and √∑x2i . Additionally,
all logarithms in this paper are natural logarithms, unless the
base is explicitly mentioned.
Local differential privacy (LDP) considers a distributed
dataset or data collection task where an attacker is assumed
to see and control the reports or records for all-but-one
respondent, and where the entire transcript of all communi-
cation must satisfy differential privacy for each respondent.
Commonly, LDP guarantees are achieved by having respon-
dents communicate only randomized reports that result from
applying a differentially private algorithm R to their data.
For any given level of privacy, there are strict limits to the
utility of datasets gathered via LDP reporting. The uncertainty
in each LDP report creates a “noise floor” below which no sig-
nal can be detected. This noise floor grows with the dimension-
ality of the reported data; therefore, compared to a Boolean
question (“Do you vape?”), a high-dimensional question about
location (“Where in the world are you?”) can be expected to
have dramatically more noise and a correspondingly worse
signal. This noise floor also grows in proportion to the square
root of the number of reports; therefore, somewhat counter-
intuitively, as more data is collected it will become harder to
detect any fixed-magnitude signal (e.g., the global distribution
of the limited, fixed set of people named Sandiego).
The algorithms used to create per-respondent LDP reports—
referred to as local randomizers—must satisfy the definition of
differential privacy for a dataset of size one; in particular, they
may satisfy the following definition based on replacement:
Definition II.2 (Replacement LDP). An algorithm R : D → S
is a replacement (ε, δ)-differentially private local randomizer
if for all S ⊆ S and for all x, x′ ∈ D:
Pr[R(x) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[R(x) ∈ S] + δ.
However, this replacement-based LDP definition is unneces-
sarily conservative—at least for finding good privacy/utility
tradeoffs in statistical reporting—although it has often been
used in prior work, because it simplifies certain analyses.
Replacement LDP compares the presence of any respon-
dent’s report against the counterfactual of being replaced
with its worst-case alternative. For distributed monitoring, a
more suitable counterfactual is one where the respondent has
decided not to send any report, and thereby has removed
themselves from the dataset. It is well known that replacement
LDP has a differential-privacy ε upper bound that for some
mechanisms can be twice that of an ε based on the removal
of a respondent’s report. For the ε > 1 regime that is typical
in LDP applications, this factor-of-two change makes a major
difference because the probability of S depends exponentially
on ε. Thus, a removal-based definition is more appropriate
for our practical privacy/utility tradeoffs. Unfortunately, a
removal-based LDP definition cannot be directly adopted in
the local model due to a technicality: removing any report
will change the support of the output distribution because
the attacker is assumed to observe all communication. To
avoid this, we can define removal-based differential privacy
generally with respect to algorithms defined only on inputs
of fixed length n, and from this define a corresponding local
randomizer:
Definition II.3 (Generalized removal (ε, δ)-DP). A ran-
domized algorithm M : Dn → S satisfies removal (ε, δ)-
differential privacy if there exists an algorithm M′ : Dn ×
2[n] → S with the following properties:
1) for all D ∈ Dn, M′(D, [n]) is identical to M(D);
2) for all D ∈ Dn and I ⊆ [n], M′(D, I) depends only on
the elements of D with indices in I;
3) for all S ⊂ S , D ∈ Dn and I, I ′ ⊆ [n] where we have
that |I 4 I ′| = 1:
Pr[M′(D, I) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[M′(D, I ′) ∈ S] + δ.
(Notably, this definition generalizes the more standard def-
inition of removal-based differential privacy where M is
defined for datasets of all sizes, by setting M′(D, I) :=
M((xi)i∈I)—i.e., by defining M′(D, I) to be M applied to
the elements of D with indices in I .)
In the distributed setting it suffices to define removal-
based LDP—as follows—by combining the above definition
with the use of a local randomizer whose properties satisfy
Definition II.3 when restricted to datasets of size 1. (For
convenience, we state this only for δ = 0, since extensions
to δ > 0 and other notions of DP are straightforward.)
Definition II.4 (Removal LDP). An algorithm R : D → S
is a removal ε-differentially private local randomizer if there
exists a random variable R0 such that for all S ⊆ S and for
all x ∈ D:
e−εPr[R0 ∈ S] ≤ Pr[R(x) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[R0 ∈ S].
Here R0 should be thought of as the output of the ran-
domizer when a respondent’s data is absent. This definition is
equivalent, up to a factor of two, to the replacement version of
the definitions. To distinguish between these two notions we
will always explicitly state “removal differential privacy” but
often omit “replacement” to refer to the more common notion.
B. Attributes, Encodings, and Fragments of Reports
There are various means by which LDP reports can be
crafted from a respondent’s data record, x ∈ D in a domain
D, using a local randomizer R. This paper considers three
specific LDP report constructions, that stem from the ESA
framework [2]—report encoding, attribute fragmentation, and
report fragmentation—each of which provides a lever for
controlling different aspects of the utility/privacy tradeoffs.
Encodings: Given a data record x, depending on its domain
D, the type of encoding can have a strong impact on the utility
of a differentially private algorithm. Concretely, consider a
setting where the domain D is a dictionary of elements (e.g.,
words in a language), and one wants to estimate the frequency
of elements in this domain, with each data record x holding
an element. One natural way to encode x is via one-hot
encoding if the cardinality of D is not too large. For large
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domains, in order to reduce communication/storage one can
use a sketching algorithm (e.g., count-mean-sketch [26]) to
establish a compact encoding. (For any given dataset and
task, and at any given level of privacy, the choice of such
an encoding will impact the empirical utility; we explore this
empirical tradeoff in the evaluations of Section VII.)
Attribute fragments: Respondents’ data records may hold
multiple independent or dependent aspects. We can, without
restriction, consider the setting where each such data record x
is encoded as a binary vector with k or fewer bits set (i.e., no
more than k non-zero coordinates). We can refer to each of
those k vector coordinates as attributes and write x =
k∑
i=1
xi,
where each xi is a one-hot vector. Given any bounded LDP
budget, there are two distinct choices for satisfying privacy
by randomizing x: either send each xi independently through
the randomizer R, splitting the privacy budget accordingly, or
sample one of the xi’s at random and spend all of privacy
budget to send it through R. As demonstrated empirically in
Section VII, we find that sampling is always better for the pri-
vacy/utility tradeoff (thereby, we verify what has been shown
analytically [16], [27]). Once a one-hot vector z is sampled
from {xi : i ∈ [k]}, we establish analytically and empirically
that for both local and central differential-privacy tradeoffs
it is advantageous to send each attribute of z independently
to LDP randomizers that produce anonymous reports. (There
are other natural variants of attributes based on this encoding
scheme e.g., in the context of learning algorithms [28], but
these are not considered in this paper.)
Report fragments: Given an ε LDP budget and an encoded
data record x, a sequence of LDP reports may be generated
by multiple independent applications of the randomizer R to
x, while still ensuring an overall ε bound on the privacy
loss. Each such report is a report fragment, containing less
information than the entire LDP report sequence. Anonymous
report fragments allow improved privacy guarantees in more
refined threat models, as we show in Section IV.
Sketch-based reports: Locally-differentially-private variants
of sketching [16], [7], [19] have been used for optimizing
communication, computation, and storage tradeoffs w.r.t. pri-
vacy/utility in the context of estimating distributions. Given
a domain {0, 1}k, the main idea is to reduce the domain
to {0, 1}κ, with κ  k, via hashing and then use locally
private protocols to operate over a domain of size κ. To avoid
significant loss of information due to hashing, and in turn
boost the accuracy, the above procedure is performed with
multiple independent hash functions. Sketching techniques can
be used in conjunction with all of the fragmentation schemes
explored in this paper, with the benefits of sketching extending
seamlessly, as we corroborate in experiments.
As a warning to practitioners, we note that sketching must
be deployed carefully, and only in conjunction with tuning
of its parameters. Sketching will add additional estimation
error—on top of the error introduced by differential privacy—
and this error can easily exceed the error introduced by
differential privacy, unless the sketching parameters are tuned
to a specific, known target dataset,
We also observe that sketching is not a requirement for
practical deployments in regimes with high local-differential
privacy, such as those explored in this paper. A primary
reason for using sketching is to reduce communication cost,
by reducing the domain size from k to κ  k, but for high-
epsilon LDP reports only a small number of bit may need to
be sent, even without sketching. If the probability of flipping
a bit is p for one-hot encodings of a domain size d, then
only the indices of p(d − 1) + (1 − p) bits need be sent—
the non-zero bits—and each such index can be sent in log2 d
bits or less. For high-epsilon one-hot-encoded LDP reports,
which apply small p to domains of modest size d, the resulting
communication cost may well be acceptable, in practice.
Table I shows some examples of applying one-hot and
sketch-based LDP report encodings to a real-world dataset,
with sketching configured as in a practical deployment [7].
As the table shows, for a central privacy guarantee of εc = 1,
only the indices of one or two bits must be sent in sketch-based
LDP reports; on the other hand, five or six bit indices must be
sent using one-hot encodings (because the attribute-fragmented
LDP reports must have ε`∞ = 12.99, which corresponds to
p = 2.28 × 10−6). However, this sixfold increase in commu-
nication cost is coupled with greatly increased utility: the top
10,000 items can be recovered quite accurately using the one-
hot encoding, while only the top 100 or so can be recovered
using the count sketch. Such a balance of utility/privacy and
communication-cost tradeoffs arises naturally in high-epsilon
one-hot encodings, while with sketching it can be achieved
only by hand-tuning the configuration of sketching parameters
to the target data distribution.
C. Anonymity and Attack Models
The basis of our attack model are the guarantees of local
differential privacy, which are quantified by ε` and place an
eε` worst-case upper bound on the information loss of each
respondent that contributes reports to the statistical monitor-
ing. These guarantees are consistent with a particularly simple
attack model for any one respondent, because the ε` privacy
guarantees hold true even when all other parties (including
other respondents) conspire to attack them—as long as that
one respondent constructs reports correctly using good ran-
domness. We write ε`∞ when this guarantee holds even if the
respondent invokes the protocol multiple (possibly unbounded)
number of times, without changing its private input.
Statistical reporting with strong privacy is also quantified
by εc, as its goal is to ensure that a central analyzer can never
reduce by more than eεc its uncertainty about any respondent’s
data—even in the worst case, for the most vulnerable and
unlucky respondent. The analyzer is assumed to be a potential
attacker which may adversarially compromise or collude with
anyone involved in the statistical reporting; if successful in
such attacks, the analyzer may be able to reduce their uncer-
tainty from eεc to eε` for at least some respondents. Unless
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the analyzer is successful in such collusion, our attack model
assumes that its εc privacy guarantee will hold.
In addition to the above, as in the ESA [2] architecture,
an intermediary termed the shuffler can be used to ensure
the anonymity of reports without having visibility into report
contents (thanks to cryptography). Our attack model includes
such a middleman even though it adds complexity, because
anonymization can greatly strengthen the εc guarantee that
guards privacy against the prying eyes of the analyzer, as
established in recent amplification results [3], [13], [29].
However, our attack model requires that the shuffler can learn
nothing about the content of reports unless it colludes with the
analyzer (this entails assumptions, e.g., about traffic analysis,
which are discussed below).
Anonymization Intermediary: In our attack model, the shuf-
fler is assumed to be an intermediary layer that consists of
K independent shuffler instances that can transport multiple
reporting channels. The shuffler must be a well-authenticated,
networked system that can securely receive and collect reports
from identifiable respondents—simultaneously, on separate
reporting channels, to efficiently use resources—and forward
those reports to the analyzer after their anonymization, without
ever having visibility into report contents (due to encryption).
Each shuffler instance must separately collect reports on each
channel into a sufficiently large set, or crowd, from enough
distinct respondents, and must output that crowd only to the
analyzer destination that is appropriate for the channel, and
only in a manner that guarantees anonymity: i.e., that origin,
order, and timing of report reception is hidden. In particular,
this anonymity can be achieved by outputting the crowd’s
records in a randomly-shuffled order, stripped of any metadata.
Our attack model abstracts away from the specifics of
disparate anonymity techniques and is not limited to shuffler
instances that output reports in a randomly shuffled order.
Depending on the primitives used to encrypt the reports,
shuffler instances may output an aggregate summary of the
reports by using a commutative, associative operator that can
compute such a summary without decryption. Such anony-
mous summaries are less general than shuffled reports (from
which they can be constructed by post-processing), but they
can be practically computed using cryptographic means [10],
[11], [30] and have seen formal analysis [19], [31]. However, if
the output is only an aggregate summary, the shuffler instance
must provide quantified means of guaranteeing the integrity
of that summary; in particular, summaries must be robust in
the face of corruption or malicious construction of any single
respondent’s report, e.g., via techniques like those in [10].
By utilizing K separate shuffler instances, each in a different
trust domain, our attack model captures the possibility of
partial compromise. The K instances should be appropriately
isolated to represent a variety of different trust assumptions,
e.g., by being resident in separate administrative domains
(physical, legislative, etc.); thereby, by choosing to which
instance they sent their reports, respondents can limit their
potential privacy risk (e.g., by choosing randomly, or in a man-
ner that represents their trust beliefs). Thereby, respondents
may retain some privacy guarantees even when certain shuffler
instances collude with attackers or are compromised. The
effects of any compromise may be further limited, temporally,
in realizations that regularly reset to a known good state; when
a respondent uses fragmentation techniques to send multiple
reports, simultaneously, or over time, we quantify as ε`1 the
worst-case privacy loss due to attacker capture of a single
report, noting that ε`1 ≤ ε`∞ will always hold.
Our attack model assumes a binary state for each shuf-
fler instance, in which it is either fully compromised, or
fully trustworthy and, further, that the compromise of one
instance does not affect the others. However, notably, in many
realizations—such as those based on Prio [10], mixnets [8],
or ESA’s blinding [2]—a single shuffler instance can be
constructed from M independent entities, such that attackers
must compromise all M entities, to be successful. Thereby,
by using a large M number of entities, and placing them in
different, separately-trusted protection domains, each shuffler
instance can be made arbitrarily trustworthy—albeit at the cost
of reduced efficiency.
Our attack model assumes that an adversary (colluding with
the analyzer) is able to monitor the network without breaking
cryptography. As a result, attackers must not benefit from
learning the identity of shufflers or reporting channels to which
respondents are reporting; this may entail that respondents
must send more reports, and send to more destinations than
strictly necessary, e.g., creating cover traffic using incorrectly-
encrypted “chaff” that will be discarded by the analyzer. Our
attack model also abstracts away from most other concerns
relating to how information may leak due to the manner in
which respondents send reports, such as via timing- or traffic-
analysis, via mistakes like report encodings that accidentally
include an identifier, or include insufficient randomization such
that reports can be linked (see the PRR discussion in [1]), or
via respondents’ participation in multiple reporting systems
that convey overlapping information.
Much like in [2], our attack model abstracts away from
the choice of cryptographic mechanisms or how respondents
acquire trusted software or keys, and how those are updated.
Finally, our attack model also abstracts away from policy
decisions such as which of their attributes respondents should
report upon, what privacy guarantees should be considered
acceptable, the manner or frequency by which respondents’
self-select for reporting, how they sample what attributes to
report upon, when or whether they should send empty chaff
reports, and what an adequate size of a crowd should be.
D. Central Differential Privacy and Amplification by Shuffling
To state the differential privacy guarantees that hold for the
view of the analyzer (to which we often refer as central pri-
vacy) we rely on privacy amplification properties of shuffling.
First results of this type were established by Erlingsson et
al. [3] who showed that shuffling amplifies privacy of arbitrary
local randomizers and Cheu et al. [13] who gave a tighter
analysis for the shuffled binary randomized response. Balle
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et al. [29] showed tighter bounds for non-interactive local
randomizers via an elegant analysis. We state here two results
we use in the rest of the paper. The first [29, Corollary 5.3.1]
is for general non-interactive mechanisms, and the second for
a binary mechanism [13, Corollary 17].
Lemma II.5. For δ ∈ [0, 1] and ε` ≤ log(n/ log(1/δ))/2,
the output of a shuffler that shuffles n reports that are outputs
of a ε`-DP local randomizers satisfy (ε, δ)-DP where ε =
O
(
(eε` − 1)√log(1/δ)/n).
Lemma II.6. Let δ ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ N, and λ ∈ [14 log(4/δ), n].
Consider a dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n. For each
bit xi consider the following randomization: xˆi ← xi w.p.(
1− λ2n
)
, and 1 − xi otherwise. The algorithm computing
an estimation of the sum Spriv = 1n−λ
(
n∑
i=1
xˆi − λ2
)
satisfies
(ε, δ)-central differential privacy where
ε =
√
32 log(4/δ)
λ−√2λ log(2/δ)
(
1− λ−
√
2λ log(2/δ)
n
)
. (1)
We will also use the advanced composition results for
differential privacy by Dwork, Rothblum and Vadhan [32] and
sharpened by Bun and Steinke [33, Corollary 8.11].
Theorem II.7 (Advanced Composition Theorem [33]). Let
M1, . . . ,Mk : Dn × S → S be algorithms such that for
all z ∈ S , i ∈ [k], Mi(·, z) satisfies (ε, δ)-DP. The
adaptive composition of these algorithms is the algorithm
that given D ∈ Dn and z0 ∈ S, outputs (z1, . . . , zk),
where zi is the output of Mi(D, zi−1) for i ∈ [k]. Then
∀ δ′ > 0 and z0 ∈ S , the adaptive composition satisfies(
kε2/2 +
√
kε ·
√
2 log(
√
kpi/2ε/δ′), δ′ + kδ
)
-DP.
When these amplification and composition results are used
to derive central privacy guarantees for collections of LDP
reports, the details matter. Depending on how information is
encoded and fragmented into the LDP reports that are sent
by each respondent, the resulting central privacy guarantee
that can be derived may vary greatly. For some types of LDP
reports, new amplification results may be required to precisely
account for the balance of utility and privacy. Specifically—
as described in the next section and further detailed in our
experiments—for sketch-based LDP reports, more precise
analysis have yet to be developed; as a result, the central
privacy guarantees that are known to hold for anonymous,
sketch-based reporting are quite unfavorable compared to
those known to hold for one-hot-encoded LDP reports.
III. HISTOGRAMS VIA ATTRIBUTE FRAGMENTING
In this section we revisit and formalize the idea of attribute
fragmenting [2]. We demonstrate its applicability in estimat-
ing high-dimensional histograms1 with strong privacy/utility
1Following a tradition in the differential-privacy literature [34], this paper
uses the term histogram for a count of the frequency of each distinct element
in a multiset drawn from a finite domain of elements.
Algorithm 1 att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR): Attribute fragmented k-
RAPPOR.
Input: Respondent data x ∈ D, LDP parameter ε`.
1: Compute x ∈ {0, 1}k, a one-hot encoding of x.
2: For each j ∈ [k], define
Rj(b, ε) :=
{
b w.p. eε/ (1 + eε)
1− b w.p. 1/ (1 + eε)
3: send Rj(x(j), ε`) to shuffler Sj for j ∈ [k]
tradeoffs. By applying recent results on privacy amplification
by shuffling [3], [13], [14], we show that attribute fragmenting
helps achieve nearly optimal privacy/utility tradeoffs both in
the central and local differential privacy models w.r.t the `∞-
error in the estimated distribution. Through an extensive set
of experiments with data sets having long-tail distributions
we show that attribute fragmenting help recover much larger
fraction of the tail for the same central privacy guarantee
(as compared to generically applying privacy amplification
by shuffling for locally private algorithms [3], [29]). In the
rest of this section, we formally state the idea of attribute
fragmenting and provide the theoretical guarantees. We defer
the experimental evaluation to Section VII-B.
Consider a local randomizer R taking inputs with k at-
tributes, i.e., inputs are of the form xi = (x
(1)
i , . . . , x
(k)
i ).
Attribute fragmenting comprises two ideas: First, decompose
the local randomizer R into att-frag(R) := (R1, . . . ,Rk),
a tuple of independent randomizers each acting on a single
attribute. Second, have each respondent report Rj(x(j)i ) to
Sj , one of k independent shuffler instances S1, . . . ,Sk that
separately anonymize all reports of a single attribute. Attribute
fragmenting is applicable whenever LDP reports about indi-
vidual attributes are sufficient for the task at hand, such as
when estimating marginals.
Attribute fragmenting can also be applied to scenarios where
the respondent’s data is not naturally in the form of fragmented
tuples. Thus, we can consider two broad scenarios when
applying attribute fragments: (1) Natural attributes such as
when reporting demographic information about age, gender,
etc., which constitute the attributes. Another example would
be app usage statistics across different apps with disjoint
information about load times, screen usage etc. (2) Synthetic
fragments where a single piece of respondent data can be
cast into a form that comprises several attributes to apply this
fragmenting technique.
An immediate application of (synthetic) fragments is to the
problem of learning histograms over a domain D of size k
where each input xi ∈ D can be represented as a “one-hot
vector” in {0, 1}k. Algorithm 1 shows how to (naturally) apply
attribute fragmenting when the local randomizer R is what is
referred to as the k-RAPPOR randomizer [35]. Theorems III.1
and III.2 demonstrate the near optimal utility/privacy tradeoff
of this scheme. We remark that Algorithm 1 is briefly de-
scribed and analyzed in [13] (for replacement LDP).
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To estimate the histogram of reports from n respondents, the
server receives and sums up bits from each shuffler instance
Sj to construct attribute-wise sums. The estimate for element
j ∈ D is computed as:
hˆj =
1
n
· e
ε` + 1
eε` − 1 ·
n∑
i=1
Rj(x(j)i , ε`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from shuffler Sj
− 1
eε` − 1 .
We show that att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR) achieves nearly optimal
utility/privacy tradeoffs both for local and central privacy
guarantees. Accuracy is defined via the `∞ error: α :=
max
j∈[k]
∣∣∣hˆj − 1n∑ni=1 x(j)i ∣∣∣.
Informally, the following theorems state that in the high-
epsilon regime, att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR) achieves privacy ampli-
fication satisfying
(
O(eε`/2/
√
n), δ
)
-central DP, and achieves
error bounded by Θ
(√
log k
neε`
)
and Θ
(√
log k
nεc
)
in terms of
its local (ε`) and central (εc) privacy respectively. Proofs are
deferred to Appendix A.
Standard lower bounds for central differential privacy imply
that the dependence of α on k, n, and εc are within logarithmic
factors of optimal. To the best of our knowledge, the analogous
dependence for ε` in the local DP model is the best known.
Theorem III.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm
att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR) satisfies removal ε`-local differential
privacy and for ε` ∈
[
1, log n− log (14 log ( 4δ ))] and
δ ≥ n− logn, att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR) satisfies removal (εc, δ)-
central differential privacy in the Shuffle model where:
εc =
√
64 · eε` · log(4/δ)
n
.
Theorem III.2 (Utility/privacy tradeoff). Algorithm
att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR) simultaneously satisfies ε`-local
differential privacy, (εc, δ)-central differential privacy
(in the Shuffle model), and has `∞-error at most α with
probability at least 1− β, where
α = Θ
(√
log(k/β)
neε`/2
)
; equiv. α = Θ
(√
log(k/β) log(1/δ)
nεc
)
.
Unlike one-hot-encoded LDP reports, for deployed sketch-
based LDP reporting schemes—such as the count sketch
of [16], [7]—there are no analyses that are known to de-
rive precise central privacy guarantees, while both leverag-
ing amplification-by-shuffling and being able to account for
attribute fragmentation. One known approach to analyzing
sketch-based LDP reports is to ignore all fragmentation and
apply a generic privacy amplification-by-shuffling result, such
as Lemma II.5; since it ignores attribute fragments its ε`
dependence is eε` , instead of eε`/2, and its central privacy
bound suffers compared to that of k-RAPPOR. A second
known approach observes that the randomizer for each indi-
vidual hash function is an instance of k-RAPPOR, for which
the lower eε`/2-type dependence holds. However, for this
second analysis, the effective size of the crowd n is reduced
by the number of hash functions used—making anonymity
less effective in amplifying privacy—and a large number of
hash functions is often required to achieve good utility. Thus,
for sketch-based LDP reports, the best known privacy/utility
tradeoffs may not be favorable, in the eyes of practitioners,
compared to those of one-hot-encoded LDP reports.
In real-world applications—unlike what is proposed
above—the number of attributes may be far too large for it
to be practical to use a separate shuffler instance for each
attribute. For example, this can be seen in the datasets of
Table II, which we use in our experiments.
However, in our attack model, efficient realizations of shuf-
fling are possible for high-epsilon LDP reports with attribute
fragmenting. For this, there need only be K shuffler instances
with each instance having a separate reporting channel for
every single attribute, for a number K that is sufficiently large
for the dataset and task at hand. For high-epsilon LDP reports,
the report encoding can be constructed such that each respon-
dent will send only a few LDP reports for a few attributes—
and if this number is small enough, those reports can still
be arranged to be sent to independent shuffler instances, e.g.,
in expectation, by randomly selecting the destination shuffler
instance. In particular, for the experiments of Table III, our
assumption of independence will hold as long as the number
of K shuffler instances is large enough for each bit to be sent
to a separate instance, with high confidence, in expectation.
IV. REPORT FRAGMENTING
While the shuffle model enables respondents to send ran-
domized reports of local data with large local differential
privacy values and still enjoy the benefits of privacy ampli-
fication, it might be desirable to further reduce the risk to
respondents’ privacy by reducing the privacy cost of each in-
dividual report. As an example, consider randomizing a single
bit with the randomizer defined in Section III. For ε` = 10,
the probability of sending a flipped bit is ≈ e−10. Therefore,
given a report from a respondent, there is a roughly 99.996%
chance of the report being identical to the respondent’s data.
This probability drops to 63.21% with ε` = 1.
Extending the ideas of fragmenting from Section III, one
might be tempted to consider the following different way to
fragment the reports: given an LDP budget of ε`, send several
reports (specifically, ε`/ε`f reports) each with LDP ε`f  ε`.
While this certainly reduces the privacy cost of each report, it
has an impact on the utility. To replace one report of ε` = 4,
with several reports of ε`f = 2 while achieving the same
utility one would need roughly exp(ε`/ε`f ) = exp(2) ∼ 7
reports, which blows up the local privacy loss. Equivalently
(see Corollary IV.2 in Appendix B), for a given local privacy
budget ε`, the `∞ error increases by a factor of roughly√
exp(ε`/2)/ε`.
Report fragments with privacy backstops: Inspired by the
concept of a permanent randomized response [1], we propose
a simple fix to the unfavorable tradeoff described above.
Instead of working with reports of local privacy ε`f on the
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Algorithm 2 r-frag(Rb,Rf , ε`b , ε`f , τ): Report fragmenting.
Input: Respondent data x, LDP ε`b , fragment LDP ε`f ,
number of fragments τ
1: x′ ← Rb(x; ε`b)
2: for i ∈ [τ ] do
3: yi = Rf (x′; ε`f )
4: end for
5: send (i, yi) to shuffler Si for i ∈ [τ ]
original respondent data, the respondent first constructs a
randomized response of the original data with a higher epsilon
ε`b (for backstop) and only outputs lower epsilon reports
on this randomized data. More precisely, given ε-DP local
randomizers Rb(·; ε) and Rf (·; ε), on input data d, a backstop
randomized report d′ ← Rb(d; ε`b) is first computed. Then,
we fragment the report into several reports ri ← Rf (d′; ε`f )
for several independent applications of Rf .
We claim to get the best of both worlds with this con-
struction. With sufficiently many reports, we get utility/privacy
results that are essentially what we can achieve with local
privacy budget of ε`b while ensuring that each report continues
to have small LDP. The backstop ensures that even with
sufficiently many reports sent to the same shuffler, the privacy
guarantee does not degrade linearly with the number of reports,
but stops degrading beyond the backstop ε`b . The only price
we pay is in additional communication overhead. The number
of fragments is only constrained by the communication costs,
though beyond a few fragments there are diminishing returns
for utility (at no cost to privacy).
The following theorem states the privacy guarantees of
report fragmenting. It analyzes the situation in which an ad-
versary has gained access to t ≤ τ fragments. It demonstrated
that the privacy of a respondent degrades gracefully as more
fragments are exposed to an adversary.
Theorem IV.1. For any ε`f , ε`b > 0, an ε`b -DP local
randomizer Rb, an ε`f -DP local randomizer Rf , an integer τ ,
and a set of indices J ⊆ [τ ] of size t, consider the algorithm
MJ that for (y1, . . . , yτ ) = r-frag(Rb,Rf , ε`b , ε`f , τ) outputs
yJ = (yi)i∈J . Then MJ is an ε-DP local randomizer for
ε = ln
(
e
ε
`b
+tε
`f +1
e
ε
`b+e
tε
`f
)
≤ min{ε`b , tε`f }.
We stated Theorem IV.1 for the standard replacement DP. If
Rb satisfies only removal ε`b -DP then MJ has the same ε`b
for removal DP. The proof is based on a general result showing
how DP guarantees are amplified when each data element is
preprocessed by a local randomizer. (Details in Appendix B.)
Report fragmenting for histograms: Here we instantiate
report fragmenting in the context of histograms. Recall, for
the histogram computation problem described in Section III,
each data sample is x =
(
x(1), · · · , x(k)) is a one-hot vector
in k dimensions. In report fragmenting with privacy backstop,
we do the following: For each i ∈ [k], we run an instance
of Algorithm 2 independently, with x(i) as respondent data.
One can view the set of report fragments generated by all the
execution of Algorithm 2 as a matrix: M(x) = [mi,j ]τ×k,
where mi,j refers to the i-th report generated for the j-th
domain element. To be most effective, report fragments should
be sent according to respondent’s trust in shuffler instances.
For the report fragmenting above, we obtain the following
accuracy/privacy tradeoff (proof in Appendix B).
Theorem IV.2 (Utility/privacy tradeoff). For a per-
report local privacy budget of ε`f > 1, backstop
privacy budget of ε`b , and number of reports τ ,
Algorithm r-frag(att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR), τ) satisfies removal
ln
(
e
ε
`b
+τε
`f +1
e
ε
`b+e
τε
`f
)
-local differential privacy and (εc, δ)-central
DP where, for any δ < 1/2:
εc = min

√
8τε`f log
2(τε`f /δ)
n
,
√
64eε`b log(4/δ)
n
 ,
has accuracy α with probability at least 1− β with:
α = O
(√
log(k/β)
nτε`f
+
√
log(k/β)
neε`b
)
.
V. CROWDS AND CROWD IDS
Foundational to this work is the concept of a crowd: a
sufficiently large set of LDP reports gathered from a large
enough set of distinct respondents, such that each LDP report
can become “lost in the crowd” and thereby anonymous. As
discussed in Section II, the shuffler intermediary must ensure,
independently, that a sufficiently large crowd is present on
every one of the shuffler’s reporting channels. Channels are
equivalent to (but more efficient than) a distinct shuffler with
its own public identity, and channels are only hosted on a
single shuffler for efficiency. As such, the identity of the
channel that a report is sent on must be assumed to be public.
As an alternative, the ESA architecture described how re-
spondents could send LDP reports annotated by a “Crowd ID”
that could be hidden by cryptographic means from both net-
work attackers and the shuffler intermediaries (using blinded
shuffling). In ESA, the reports for each Crowd ID were
grouped together, shuffled separately, and only output if their
cardinality was sufficient; furthermore, this cardinality thresh-
old was randomized for privacy. Revisiting this alternative,
we find that annotating LDP reports by IDs can be helpful,
in those cases where respondents have an existing reason
to publicly self-identify as belonging to a data partition—
e.g., because they are unable to hide their use of certain
computer hardware or software, or do not want to hide their
coarse-grained location, nationality, or language preferences.
On the other hand, given the strength of the recent privacy
amplification results based on anonymity, we find little to no
value remaining in the use of ESA’s Crowd IDs as a distinct
reporting channel (i.e., reporting some data via an LDP report
and some data via that report’s ID annotation).
We can formally define ESA’s Crowd IDs as being the set
of indices {1, . . . ,m} for any partitioning of an underlying
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dataset of LDP records D = {x1, . . . , xn} ∈ Dn into disjoint
subsets D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dm. For tasks like those in Sec-
tion III, separately analyzing each subset Di can significantly
improve utility whenever reports that carry the same signal
are partitioned into the same subset—i.e., if reports about the
same values are associated with the same ID. The expected
(un-normalized) `∞-norm estimation error for each partition
Di will be
√|Di|/eε` , if the records in the dataset have an
ε` privacy guarantee, compared to
√|D|/eε` for the whole
dataset. Therefore, for equal-size Crowd ID partitions, the
utility of monitoring can be improved by a factor of
√
m,
and, if partition sizes vary a lot, the estimation error may be
improved much more for the smaller partitions.
However, the utility improvement of Crowd IDs must come
at a cost to privacy. After all, Crowd IDs are visible to the
analyzer and can be considered as the first component of a
report pair, along with their associated LDP report. As such,
their total privacy cost can only be bounded by ε` + ε̂`: the
sum of each LDP report’s ε` bound and any bound ε̂` that
holds for its associated Crowd ID (and this ε̂` may be ∞).
Even without a bound on the Crowd ID privacy loss,
respondents may want to send ID-annotated LDP reports. In
particular, this may be because partitioning is based on aspects
of data that raise few privacy concerns, or are seen as being
public already (e.g., the rough geographic origin of a mobile
phone’s data connection). Alternatively, this may be because
respondents see a direct benefit from sending reports in a
manner that improves the utility of monitoring.
For example, respondents may desire to receive improved
services by sending reports whose IDs depend on the version
of their software, the type of their hardware device, and
their general location (e.g., metropolitan area). Or, to help
build better predictive keyboards, respondents may send LDP
reports about the words they type annotated by their software’s
preferred-language settings (e.g., EN-US, EN-IN, CHS, or
CHT); such partitioned LDP reporting is realistic and has been
deployed in practice [7], [36]. For lack of a better term, we
can refer to such partitioning as natural Crowd IDs.
However, even when Crowd IDs are derived from public
data, the cardinality of each partition may be a privacy
concern—at least for small partitions—if Crowd IDs are
derived without randomization. The shuffler intermediary can
address this privacy concern by applying randomized thresh-
olding, as outlined in the original ESA paper [2]. For a more
complete description, Algorithm 3 shows how the shuffler can
drop reports before applying a fixed threshold in order to make
each partition’s cardinality differentially private; furthermore,
formal privacy and utility guarantee is given in Theorem V.1
and Theorem V.2 and Appendix C includes proofs.
Theorem V.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 3 satisfies
(εcr, δcr)-central differential privacy on the counts of records
in each crowd.
Theorem V.2 (Utility guarantee). Algorithm 3 ensures that for
all crowds i, |Ri \R′i| ≤ 4εcr log
(
2P
δcr
)
with prob. ≥ 1− δcr.
Algorithm 3 Randomized Report Deletion.
Input: reports partitioned by Crowd ID: {Ri}[P ],
privacy parameters: (εcr, δcr).
1: for i ∈ [P ] do
2: ni ← |Ri|
3: nˆi ← max{ni + Laplace
(
2
εcr
)− 2εcr log ( 2δcr ) , 0}
4: if nˆi ≤ ni then
5: R′i ← Ri\ {(ni − nˆi) uniformly chosen records}
6: else
7: Abort
8: end if
9: end for
10: return The new partitioning by Crowd ID: (R′1, . . . , R′P )
Data-derived Crowds IDs: In addition to natural Crowd IDs,
ESA proposed that LDP reports could be partitioned in a
purely data-dependent manner—e.g., by deriving Crowd IDs
by using deterministic hash functions on the data being
reported—and reported on the utility of such partitioning in
experiments [2]. While such data-derived Crowd IDs can
improve utility, their privacy/utility tradoffs cannot compete
with those offered by recent privacy amplification results
based on anonymity. The following simple example serves
to illustrate how amplification-by-shuffling have made data-
derived Crowd IDs obsolete.
Let’s assume LDP records are partitioned by a hash function
h : D → [m], for m = 2, with the output of h defining a
binary data-derived Crowd ID. For worst-case analysis, we
must assume a degenerate h that maps any particular z ∈ D
to 0 and all other values in D to 1. Therefore, the Crowd ID
must be treated as holding the same information as any value
z contained in an LDP report with an ε` privacy guarantee;
this entails that the Crowd ID must be randomized to establish
for it a privacy bound ε̂`, if the privacy loss for any value z
is to be limited. As a result, ID-annotated LDP reports have
a combined privacy bound of ε` + ε̂`, and any fixed privacy
budget must be split between those two parameters.
ESA proposed that data-derived Crowd IDs could be sub-
jected to little randomization (i.e., that ε̂`  ε`). Thereby,
ESA implicitly discounted the privacy loss of data-derived
Crowd IDs, with the justification that they were only revealed
when the cardinality of report subsets was above a randomized,
large threshold. In certain special cases—e.g., when ε` = 0—
such discounting may be appropriate, since randomized aggre-
gate cardinality counts can limit the risk due to circumstances
like that of the degenerate hash function h above. However,
in general, accurately accounting for the privacy loss bounded
by ε` + ε̂` reveals that it is best to not utilize data-derived
Crowd IDs at all. The best privacy/utility tradeoff is achieved
by setting ε̂` = 0 and not splitting the privacy budget at all
(cf. Table VI and Table VII), while amplification-by-shuffling
with attribute fragmenting can be used to establish meaningful
central privacy guarantees.
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Algorithm 4 LDP-SGD; client-side
Input: Local privacy parameter: ε`e, current model: θt ∈
Rd, `2-clipping norm: L.
1: Compute clipped gradient
x← ∇`(θt; d) ·min
{
1,
L
‖∇`(θt; d)‖2
}
.
2: zi ←
{
L · x‖x‖2 w.p. 12 +
‖x‖2
2L ,
−L · x‖x‖2 otherwise.
3: Sample v ∼u Sd, the unit sphere in d dimensions.
4: zˆ ←
{
sgn(〈z,v〉) · v w.p. eε`e1+eε`e .
−sgn(〈z,v〉) · v otherwise.
5: return zˆ.
VI. MACHINE LEARNING IN THE ESA FRAMEWORK
In this section we demonstrate that ESA framework is
suitable for training machine learning models with strong
local and central differential privacy guarantees. We show both
theoretically (for convex models), and empirically (in general)
that one can have strong per epoch local differential privacy
(denoted by ε`e), and good central differential privacy overall,
while achieving nearly state-of-the-art (for differentially pri-
vate models) accuracy on benchmark data sets (e.g., MNIST
and CIFAR-10).
Per-epoch local differential privacy refers to the LDP guar-
antee for a respondent over a single pass over the dataset.
Here we assume that each epoch is executed on a separate
shuffler, and the adversary can observe the traffic onto only
one of those shufflers. However, it is worth mentioning that
the central differential privacy guarantee we provide is over
the complete execution of the model training algorithm.
Formally, we show the following:
1) For convex Empirical Risk Minimization problems
(ERMs), with local differential privacy guarantees per
report on the data sample, and amplification via shuffling
in the ESA framework, we achieve optimal privacy/utility
tradeoffs w.r.t. excess empirical risk and the correspond-
ing central differential privacy guarantee.
2) Empirically, we show that one can achieve accuracies
of 95% on MNIST, 70% on CIFAR-10, and 78% on
Fashion-MNIST, with per epoch ε`e ≈ 1.9.
In the rest of this section, we state the algorithm, privacy
analysis, and the utility analysis for convex losses. We defer
the empirical evaluation to Section VII-C.
Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM): Consider a dataset
D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dn, a set of models C ⊆ Rd which is
not necessarily convex, and a loss function ` : C × D → R.
The problem of ERM is to estimate a model θˆ ∈ C such that:
R(θˆ) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θˆ;xi)−min
θ∈C
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ;xi)
Algorithm 5 LDP-SGD; server-side
Input: Local privacy budget per epoch: ε`e, number of
epochs: T , parameter set: C.
1: θ0 ← {0}d.
2: for t ∈ [T ] do
3: Send θt to all clients.
4: Collect shuffled responses (zˆi)i∈[n].
5: Noisy gradient: gt ← L
√
pi
2
· Γ(
d−1
2
+1)
Γ( d2+1)
·
eε`e+1
eε`e−1
(
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
zˆi
)
.
6: Update: θt+1 ← ΠC (θt − ηt · gt), where ΠC(·) is the
`2-projection onto set C, and ηt = ‖C‖2
√
n
L
√
d
· eε`e−1eε`e+1 .
7: end for
8: return θpriv ← θT .
is small. In this work we revisit the locally differentially
private SGD algorithm of Duchi et al. [17], denoted LDP-
SGD (Algorithms 4 and 5), to estimate a θpriv ∈ C s.t. i)
R(θpriv) is small, and ii) the computation of R(θpriv) satisfies
per-epoch local differential privacy of ε`e, and overall central
differential privacy of (εc, δ) (Theorem VI.1). We remark that,
by adapting the analysis from [37], one can similarly address
the problem of stochastic convex optimization in which the
goal is to minimize the expected population loss on a dataset
drawn i.i.d. from some distribution. At a high level, LDP-SGD
follows the following template of noisy stochastic gradient
descent [38], [39], [40].
1) Encode: Given a current state θt, apply ε`e-DP random-
izer from [17] to the gradient at θt on all (or a subset of)
the data samples in D.
2) Shuffle: Shuffle all the gradients received.
3) Analyze: Average these gradients, and call it gt. Update
the current model as θt+1 ← θt − ηt · gt, where η is the
learning rate.
4) Perform steps (1)–(3) for T iterations.
In Theorem VI.1, we state the privacy guarantees for LDP-
SGD. Furthermore, we show that under central differential
guarantee achieved via shuffling, in the case of convex ERM
(i.e., when the the loss function ` is convex in its first
parameter), we are able to recover the optimal privacy/utility
tradeoffs (up to logarithmic factors in n) w.r.t. the central
differential privacy stated in [40]. (proof in Appendix D).
Theorem VI.1 (Privacy/utility tradeoff). Let per-epoch local
differential privacy budget be ε`e ≤ (log n)/4.
1) Privacy guarantee; applicable generally: Over T iter-
ations, in the shuffle model, LDP-SGD satisfies (εc, δ)-
central differential privacy where:
εc = O
(
eε`e − 1√
n
·
√
T log2(T/δ)
)
.
2) Utility guarantee; applicable with convexity: If we set
T = n/ log2 n, and the loss function `(·; ·) is convex
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in its first parameter and L-Lipschitz w.r.t. `2-norm, the
expected excess empirical loss satisfies
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θpriv;xi)
]
−min
θ∈C
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ;xi)
= O
(
L‖C‖2
√
d log2 n
n
· e
ε`e + 1
eε`e − 1
)
.
Here ‖C‖2 is the `2-diameter of the set C.
Reducing communication cost using PRGs: LDP-SGD is
designed to operate in a distributed setting and it is useful
to design techniques to minimize the overall communication
from devices to a server. Observe that in the client-side
algorithm (Algorithm 4) the only object that depends on
data is the sign of the inner product in the computation
of zˆ. By agreeing with the server on a common sampling
procedure Samp : {0, 1}len → Sd taking len uniform bits
and producing a uniform sample in Sd, clients can com-
municate sgn(〈z,Samp(r)〉) and randomness r instead of zˆ.
This can be further minimized by replacing randomness r of
length len with the seed s of length 128 bits and producing
r ← PRG(s) where PRG is a pseudorandom generator
stretching uniform short seeds to potentially much longer pseu-
dorandom sequences. Thus, communication can be reduced
to 129 bits by sending (sgn, s) and the server reconstructing
zˆ = (sgn)Samp(PRG(s)).
Note that only the utility of this scheme is affected by the
quality of the pseudorandom generator (i.e., the uniform ran-
domness of the PRG). Revealing the PRG seed s is equivalent
to publishing v, which is independent of the user’s input z;
therefore, reducing communication through the use of a PRG
with suitable security properties does not affect the privacy
guarantees of the resulting mechanism.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section covers the experimental evaluation of the ideas
described in Sections III–VI. We consider three scenarios. In
the first set of experiments, we consider a typical power law
distribution for discovering heavy hitters [16] that is derived
from real data collected on a popular browser platform. The
second, inspired by increasing uses of differential privacy for
hiding potentially sensitive location data, considers histogram
estimation over flat-tailed distributions, where a small number
of respondents contribute to a great many number of cate-
gories. In order to visualize the privacy/utility tradeoffs, as is
natural in these distributions over locations, we select three
distributions that correspond to pixel values in three images.
The third set of experiments apply ideas in Section VI to
train models to within state-of-the-art guarantees on standard
benchmark datasets.
A. A Dataset with a Heavy-Hitter Powerlaw Distribution
We consider the “Heavy-hitter” distribution shown in Ta-
ble II, as it is representative of on-line behavioral patterns. It
comprises 200 million reports collected over a period of one
week from a 1.7-million-value domain. The distribution is a
mixture of about a hundred heavy hitters and a power law dis-
tribution with the probability density function p(x) ∝ x−1.35.
Our experiments target different central DP εc values to
demonstrate the utility of the techniques described in previous
sections. Specifically, we experiment with a few central DP
guarantees. For each given εc, we consider attribute fragment-
ing with the corresponding ε` computed using Theorem III.1,
and report fragmenting with 4, 16 and 256 reports. The
fragmenting parameters ε`b and ε`f are selected so that the
central DP is εc and the variance introduced in the report
fragmenting step is roughly the same as that of the backstop
step. We compare the results with a baseline method—the
Gaussian mechanism that guarantees only central DP.
We enforce local differential privacy by randomizing the
one-hot encoding of the item, as well as using the private
count-sketch algorithm [16], [7], which has been demonstrated
to work well over distributions with a very large support. When
using private count-sketch, as in [16], [7], we use the protocol
where each respondent sends one report of their data to one
randomly sampled hash function. This setting is different from
the original non-private count-sketch algorithm, where each
respondent sends their data to all hash functions. This is
because we need to take into consideration the noise used
to guarantee local differential privacy. In fact, for the count-
sketch algorithm we use, it can be shown [16], [27] that under
the same local DP budget used in the experiments, the utility
is always the best when each respondent sends their data only
to one hash function.
Table I shows our experimental results. In each experi-
ment, we report ε`∞—the LDP guarantee when the adversary
observes all reports from the respondent, corresponding to
Theorem IV.1 with t = τ , and (when using report fragmenting)
ε`1—the LDP guarantee when the adversary observes only one
report from the respondent, corresponding to Theorem IV.1
with t = 1. For the Gaussian mechanism, we report σ—the
standard deviation of the zero mean Gaussian noise used to
achieve the desired level of central privacy.
To measure the utility of the algorithms, we compare the
true and estimated frequencies. We also report the expected
communication cost for one-hot encoding and count-sketch,
as discussed in Section II-B. The specific sketching algorithm
we consider is the one described in [7].
Our experimental results demonstrate that:
• With attribute fragmenting and report fragmenting with
various number of reports, we achieve close to optimal
privacy-utility tradeoffs and recover the top 10,000 fre-
quent items of the total probability mass with good central
differential privacy εc ≤ 1.
• It is harder to bound the central privacy of count-sketch
LDP reports; using off-the-shelf parameters [16], [7]
results in slightly less communication cost, but this can
come at a very high cost to utility. As we discuss in
Section III, and elsewhere, one-hot encodings may be
preferable in in the high-epsilon regime, at least until
stronger results exist for sketch-based encodings.
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TABLE I: Results of experiments reconstructing the heavy-hitters dataset whose distribution is given in Table II. Different
utility results from anonymous LDP reports with attribute- and report fragmenting (with τ = 4, 16 and 256 reports), at central
privacy (εc, δc)-central DP with δc = 5× 10−10. We report the expected number of bits set (and, therefore, the messages sent)
for one-hot encoding and count-sketch with attribute fragmenting, represented by #bits1-hot and #bitssketch, for sketch-based
reports using the parameters of Apple’s real-world deployment [7].
Privacy Guarantees One-hot encoding(domain size 1,778,120)
Count sketch encoding
(1,024 hash functions, sketch size 65,536)
For one-hot encoding, εc = 0.0025
For sketching, 0.0025 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
(from known analyses)
σ = 1821.02
For attribute fragmenting, ε`∞ = 1.78
For τ = 4, ε`∞ = 1.45, ε`1 = 0.47
For τ = 16, ε`∞ = 1.50, ε`1 = 0.13
For τ = 256, ε`∞ = 1.52, ε`1 = 0.01
#bits1-hot= 256589.00
#bitssketch= 9457.76
For one-hot encoding, εc = 0.01
For sketching, 0.01 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
(from known analyses)
σ = 455.34
ε`∞ = 4.07
For τ = 4, ε`1 = 2.47
For τ = 16, ε`1 = 1.30
For τ = 256, ε`1 = 0.11
#bits1-hot= 29856.75
#bitssketch= 1101.36
For one-hot encoding, εc = 0.05
For sketching, 0.05 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
(from known analyses)
σ = 91.16
ε`∞ = 7.235
For τ = 4, ε`1 = 5.63
For τ = 16, ε`1 = 4.40
For τ = 256, ε`1 = 1.72
#bits1-hot= 1281.93
#bitssketch= 48.21
For one-hot encoding, εc = 0.25
For sketching, 0.25 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
(from known analyses)
σ = 18.32
ε`∞ = 10.40
For τ = 4, ε`1 = 8.79
For τ = 16, ε`1 = 7.56
For τ = 256, ε`1 = 4.85
#bits1-hot= 55.11
#bitssketch= 2.99
For one-hot encoding, εc = 1.0
For sketching, 1.0 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
(from known analyses)
σ = 4.66
ε`∞ = 12.99
For τ = 4, ε`1 = 11.38
For τ = 16, ε`1 = 10.15
For τ = 256, ε`1 = 7.44
#bits1-hot= 5.06
#bitssketch= 1.15
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TABLE II: Statistics of datasets in experiments; in images, we take each unit of luminosity as being one respondent’s presence.
Map Horse Child Heavy-hitter
Image size 1365× 2048 274× 320 721× 497 –
Domain size 2,795,520 87,680 358,337 1,778,120
Count of
“respondents” 236,559,063 1,914,589 50,409,435 203,950,512
Per-pixel
luminosity (i.e.,
“respondent”
count) sorted by
magnitude
TABLE III: Reconstructions of the Table II datasets with an (εc, δc) central privacy guarantee, based on reports using removal
LDP and attribute fragmenting. The initial three rows show reconstructions from reports using randomized one-hot encodings
of “respondent” data. The last row is based on 65,536-bit-long Count-Mean-Sketch-encoded reports using 1,024 hash functions,
just like those used in Apple’s real-world deployment [7]. As ε`∞ increases, the expected number of bits set in the encodings
(#bits) is greatly reduced, making it practical to send each bit as a separate, anonymous report fragment.
Map Horse Child Heavy-hitter
(δc = 5× 10−10) (δc = 5× 10−8) (δc = 5× 10−9) (δc = 5× 10−10)
LDP reports
with ε` = 2.0
and a varying
central epsilon
guarantee
εc = 0.0011 εc = 0.0111 εc = 0.0023 εc = 0.0012
RMSE = 182.17 RMSE = 129.13 RMSE = 138.06 RMSE = 3565.88
#bits = 333234.91 #bits = 10452.47 #bits = 42715.58 #bits = 211957.86
High-epsilon
LDP reports
with a central
guarantee
εc = 0.05
ε`∞ = 7.385 ε`∞ = 2.94 ε`∞ = 5.95 ε`∞ = 7.235
RMSE = 150.54 RMSE = 118.40 RMSE = 121.81 RMSE = 234.28
#bits = 1734.52 #bits = 4403.42 #bits = 932.34 #bits = 1281.93
High-epsilon
LDP reports
with a central
guarantee
εc = 1.0
ε`∞ = 13.14 ε`∞ = 8.55 ε`∞ = 11.7 ε`∞ = 12.99
RMSE = 61.31 RMSE = 12.96 RMSE = 20.13 RMSE = 15.82
#bits = 6.49 #bits = 17.97 #bits = 3.97 #bits = 5.06
Sketch-based
high-epsilon
LDP reports.
Known analyses
imply a central
guarantee of
1 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞ ε`∞ = 13.14 ε`∞ = 8.55 ε`∞ = 11.7 ε`∞ = 12.99
RMSE = 79.73 RMSE = 13.25 RMSE = 34.54 RMSE = 2583.13
#bits = 1.13 #bits = 13.68 #bits = 1.54 #bits = 1.15
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TABLE IV: Experimental results of reconstructing the Horse image dataset by varying εc and evaluating a central DP
mechanism, attribute fragmenting, and both attribute and report fragmenting achieving (εc, δc)-central DP with δc = 5× 10−8.
Central privacy
guarantee
No LDP
(Gaussian mechanism)
Attribute-fragmented
LDP report
Attribute- and report-fragmented LDP reports
τ = 4 reports τ = 16 reports τ = 256 reports
εc = 0.05
σ = 80.42,
ε`∗ =∞
ε`∞ = 2.94,
ε`1 = 2.94
ε`∞ = 2.91,
ε`1 = 1.37
ε`∞ = 2.94,
ε`1 = 0.50
ε`∞ = 2.94,
ε`1 = 0.03
RMSE = 51.09 RMSE = 118.40 RMSE = 128.05 RMSE = 132.46 RMSE = 139.47
εc = 0.25
σ = 16.18,
ε`∗ =∞
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 5.96
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 4.35
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 3.13
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 0.70
RMSE = 10.72 RMSE = 45.01 RMSE = 63.01 RMSE = 63.67 RMSE = 82.12
εc = 0.5
σ = 8.15,
ε`∗ =∞
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 7.28
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 5.67
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 4.45
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 1.76
RMSE = 5.40 RMSE = 23.79 RMSE = 33.60 RMSE = 33.59 RMSE = 36.27
εc = 0.75
σ = 5.47,
ε`∗ =∞
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 8.03
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 6.42
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 5.19
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 2.49
RMSE = 3.67 RMSE = 16.46 RMSE = 23.22 RMSE = 23.20 RMSE = 24.17
εc = 1.0
σ = 4.14,
ε`∗ =∞
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 8.55
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 6.94
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 5.71
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 3.00
RMSE = 2.78 RMSE = 12.96 RMSE = 17.92 RMSE = 18.01 RMSE = 18.39
TABLE V: Experimental results for LDP reports using count-sketch encodings with 1,024 hash functions and sketch size
65,536, following Apple’s practical deployment [7]. Like in Table IV, the task is to reconstruct the Horse dataset, for varying
εc, using a central DP mechanism, attribute fragmenting, and both attribute and report fragmenting at (εc, δc)-central DP with
δc = 5× 10−8. To demonstrate the estimation error introduced by the sketching algorithm, the last row gives the non-private
baseline.
Central privacy
guarantee
Attribute-fragmented
LDP report
Attribute- and report-fragmented LDP reports
τ = 4 reports τ = 16 reports τ = 256 reports
0.05 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
ε`∞ = 2.94,
ε`1 = 2.94
ε`∞ = 2.91,
ε`1 = 1.37
ε`∞ = 2.94,
ε`1 = 0.50
ε`∞ = 2.94,
ε`1 = 0.03
RMSE = 118.57 RMSE = 128.34 RMSE = 132.52 RMSE = 139.47
0.25 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 5.96
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 4.35
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 3.13
ε`∞ = 5.96,
ε`1 = 0.70
RMSE = 45.47 RMSE = 62.82 RMSE = 63.70 RMSE = 81.91
0.5 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 7.28
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 5.67
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 4.45
ε`∞ = 7.28,
ε`1 = 1.76
RMSE = 24.11 RMSE = 33.62 RMSE = 33.78 RMSE = 36.66
0.75 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 8.03
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 6.42
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 5.19
ε`∞ = 8.03,
ε`1 = 2.49
RMSE = 17.05 RMSE = 23.60 RMSE = 23.40 RMSE = 24.48
1.0 ≤ εc ≤ ε`∞
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 8.55
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 6.94
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 5.71
ε`∞ = 8.55,
ε`1 = 3.00
RMSE = 13.25 RMSE = 18.32 RMSE = 18.43 RMSE = 18.74
εc =∞ ε`∗ =∞ ε`∗ =∞ ε`∗ =∞ ε`∗ =∞RMSE = 4.12 RMSE = 4.12 RMSE = 4.12 RMSE = 4.12
B. Datasets with Low-amplitude and Flat-tailed Distributions
We consider three datasets described below.
Phone Location Dataset: We consider a real-world dataset
created by Richard Harris, a graphics editor on The Times’s
Investigations team showing 235 million points gathered from
1.2 million smartphones [5].2 The resulting dataset is con-
structed by taking 2.5× the luminosity values (ranging from
0 to 255) of the image to scale up the number of datapoints
2Direct link to image: https://static01.nyt.com/images/2018/12/14/business
/10location-insider/10location-promo-superJumbo-v2.jpg.
such that the total number of reports is around 235 million,
with each person reporting coordinates in a 1365×2048 grid.
Horse Image Dataset: As in the phone location dataset, we
consider the dataset corresponding to the image of a sketch of
a horse with contours highlighted in white. Due to the majority
black nature of this image, it serves as a good test-case for
the scenario where the tail is flat, but somewhat sparse.
Child Image Dataset: We use this drawing of a child origi-
nally used by Ledig et al. [41] (converted to a grayscale) to
represent a dense distribution with an average luminosity of
roughly 140 and no black pixels. A dense, flat tail distribu-
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TABLE VI: Experimental results of reconstructing the Horse image dataset from a collection of anonymous reports that result
from running the LDP reporting protocol one, two, or five times for every single respondent, using all, half, or a fifth of each
respondent’s ε` privacy budget, respectively. In each case, the LDP reports also utilize attribute fragmenting. In all experiments,
the best utility is achieved when the entire ε` privacy budget is used to construct LDP reports in a single run.
Local privacy
guarantee Single LDP run Two LDP runs Five LDP runs
Total ε`=2.94 RMSE = 118.40 RMSE = 157.76 RMSE = 166.50
Total ε`=5.96 RMSE = 45.01 RMSE = 127.07 RMSE = 154.87
Total ε`=7.28 RMSE = 23.79 RMSE = 107.85 RMSE = 148.45
Total ε`=8.03 RMSE = 16.46 RMSE = 96.02 RMSE = 145.09
Total ε`=8.55 RMSE = 12.96 RMSE = 88.49 RMSE = 141.44
TABLE VII: Experimental results of reconstructing the Horse image dataset from LDP reports about the results of one, two,
or five sketching hash functions, based on count sketching with 1,024 hash functions and sketch size 65,536. (In each case,
the LDP reports also utilize attribute fragmenting.) In all experiments, the best utility is achieved when LDP reports use the
entire ε` privacy budget to report on the result of a single hash function.
Local privacy
guarantee One hash function Two hash functions Five hash functions
Total ε`=2.94 RMSE = 118.57 RMSE = 129.86 RMSE = 135.17
Total ε`=5.96 RMSE = 45.47 RMSE = 105.85 RMSE = 126.16
Total ε`=7.28 RMSE = 24.11 RMSE = 89.41 RMSE = 122.00
Total ε`=8.03 RMSE = 17.05 RMSE = 78.79 RMSE = 118.56
Total ε`=8.55 RMSE = 13.25 RMSE = 71.53 RMSE = 117.06
TABLE VIII: Results of experiments reconstructing the phone-location Map dataset by varying εc and evaluating a central DP
mechanism, attribute fragmenting, and both attribute and report fragmenting achieving (εc, δc)-central DP with δc = 5×10−10.
Central privacy
guarantee
No LDP
(Gaussian mechanism)
Attribute-fragmented
LDP report
Attribute- and report-fragmented LDP reports
τ = 4 reports τ = 16 reports τ = 256 reports
εc = 0.05
σ = 91.16,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 7.39,
ε`1 = 7.39
ε`∞ = 7.39,
ε`1 = 5.78
ε`∞ = 7.39,
ε`1 = 4.55
ε`∞ = 7.39,
ε`1 = 1.86
RMSE = 62.08 RMSE = 150.54 RMSE = 160.02 RMSE = 160.19 RMSE = 161.85
εc = 0.25
σ = 18.32,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 10.56,
ε`1 = 10.56
ε`∞ = 10.56,
ε`1 = 8.95
ε`∞ = 10.56,
ε`1 = 7.72
ε`∞ = 10.56,
ε`1 = 5.01
RMSE = 14.80 RMSE = 83.01 RMSE = 97.15 RMSE = 97.24 RMSE = 97.28
εc = 0.5
σ = 9.21,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 11.88,
ε`1 = 11.88
ε`∞ = 11.88,
ε`1 = 10.27
ε`∞ = 11.88,
ε`1 = 9.04
ε`∞ = 11.88,
ε`1 = 6.33
RMSE = 7.83 RMSE = 67.31 RMSE = 73.74 RMSE = 73.76 RMSE = 73.75
εc = 0.75
σ = 6.18,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 12.63,
ε`1 = 12.63
ε`∞ = 12.63,
ε`1 = 11.02
ε`∞ = 12.63,
ε`1 = 9.79
ε`∞ = 12.63,
ε`1 = 7.08
RMSE = 5.39 RMSE = 63.00 RMSE = 66.79 RMSE = 66.79 RMSE = 66.80
εc = 1.0
σ = 4.66,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 13.14,
ε`1 = 13.14
ε`∞ = 13.14,
ε`1 = 11.53
ε`∞ = 13.14,
ε`1 = 10.30
ε`∞ = 13.14,
ε`1 = 7.59
RMSE = 4.13 RMSE = 61.31 RMSE = 63.80 RMSE = 63.85 RMSE = 63.83
tion is one of the more challenging scenarios for accurately
estimating differentially private histograms.
Table II shows the distributions and statistics of each of
these datasets. As stated before, in our experiments we assume
that for every (x, y) with luminosity L ∈ [0, 255], there are
L respondents (for the phone location dataset, this count is
scaled) each holding a message (x, y). Each (x, y) is converted
into a one-hot-encoded LDP report sent using attribute and
report fragmenting for improved central privacy.
In Tables III–IX we report for each dataset on the results
of experiments similar to those we performed for the heavy-
hitters dataset (shown in Table I). At various central privacy
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TABLE IX: Results of experiments reconstructing the Child image dataset by varying εc and evaluating a central DP mechanism,
attribute fragmenting, and both attribute and report fragmenting achieving (εc, δc)-central DP with δc = 5× 10−9.
Central privacy
guarantee
No LDP
(Gaussian mechanism)
Attribute-fragmented
LDP report
Attribute- and report-fragmented LDP reports
τ = 4 reports τ = 16 reports τ = 256 reports
εc = 0.05
σ = 85.95,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 5.95,
ε`1 = 5.95
ε`∞ = 5.95,
ε`1 = 4.34
ε`∞ = 5.95,
ε`1 = 3.12
ε`∞ = 5.95,
ε`1 = 0.69
RMSE = 70.68 RMSE = 121.81 RMSE = 127.40 RMSE = 127.50 RMSE = 131.22
εc = 0.25
σ = 17.28,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 9.11,
ε`1 = 9.11
ε`∞ = 9.11,
ε`1 = 7.50
ε`∞ = 9.11,
ε`1 = 6.27
ε`∞ = 9.11,
ε`1 = 3.56
RMSE = 17.06 RMSE = 63.84 RMSE = 80.65 RMSE = 80.46 RMSE = 81.27
εc = 0.5
σ = 8.70,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 10.435,
ε`1 = 10.435
ε`∞ = 10.435,
ε`1 = 8.83
ε`∞ = 10.435,
ε`1 = 7.60
ε`∞ = 10.435,
ε`1 = 4.89
RMSE = 8.68 RMSE = 36.56 RMSE = 49.72 RMSE = 49.69 RMSE = 49.80
εc = 0.75
σ = 5.84,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 11.18,
ε`1 = 11.18
ε`∞ = 11.18,
ε`1 = 9.57
ε`∞ = 11.18,
ε`1 = 8.34
ε`∞ = 11.18,
ε`1 = 5.63
RMSE = 5.84 RMSE = 25.83 RMSE = 35.67 RMSE = 35.81 RMSE = 35.77
εc = 1.0
σ = 4.41,
ε`1 =∞
ε`∞ = 11.7,
ε`1 = 11.7
ε`∞ = 11.7,
ε`1 = 10.09
ε`∞ = 11.7,
ε`1 = 8.86
ε`∞ = 11.7,
ε`1 = 6.15
RMSE = 4.40 RMSE = 20.13 RMSE = 28.03 RMSE = 28.07 RMSE = 28.17
TABLE X: Alternative central differential-privacy bounds for
LDP reports like those in the first three rows of Table III, com-
puted without the use of attribute fragmenting as the minimum
of the LDP guarantee and the central bound from [29].
Row 1 Row 2 Row 3
(ε` = 2.0) (With attr.-frag. (With attr.-frag.
εc = 0.05) εc = 1.0)
Map εc = 0.0729 εc = 7.385 εc = 13.14
Horse εc = 1.0766 εc = 2.940 εc = 8.55
Child εc = 0.1517 εc = 5.950 εc = 11.70
Heavy-hitter εc = 0.0788 εc = 7.235 εc = 12.99
levels, we show the measured utility of anonymous LDP
reporting with attribute and report fragmenting compared to
the utility of analysis without any local privacy guarantee (the
Gaussian mechanism applied to the original data). To measure
utility, we report the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the
resulting histogram estimate.
The essence of our results can be seen in Table III, and its
companion Table X. At relatively low LDP report privacy of
ε` = 2.0, none of the three datasets can be reconstructed, at
all, whereas at higher ε` reconstruction becomes feasible; at
εc = 1.0, reconstruction is very good, and the number of LDP
report messages sent per respondent is very low. As shown
in Table X, such high utility at a strong central privacy is
only made feasible by the application of both amplification-
by-shuffling and attribute fragmenting.
For each of these three datasets, Tables IV–IX give detailed
results of further experiments.3 Most of these follow the pat-
tern set by Table III, while giving more details. The exceptions
are Table VI and Table VII), which empirically demonstrate
how each respondent’s LDP budget is best spent on sending
a single LDP report (while appropriately applying attribute or
report fragmentation to that single report).
3The reconstructed images missing in these tables are included in ancillary
files at https://arxiv.org/abs/XXXX.YYYY.
In our experiments we show:
1) attribute fragmenting helps us achieve nearly optimal
central privacy/accuracy tradeoff,
2) report fragmenting helps us achieve reasonable central
privacy with strong per-report local privacy under various
number of reports.
TABLE XI: Estimating privacy lower bounds via membership
inference attacks.
(a) TPR−FPR. Mean and standard deviation over 10 runs.
TPR−FPR MNIST Fashion-MNSIT CIFAR-10
ESA 0.0017± 0.0014 0.0130± 0.0024 0.0097± 0.0014
DPSGD 0.0017± 0.0016 0.0122± 0.0012 0.0095± 0.0005
(b) Upper bound of privacy loss as εc, and lower bound from
membership inference attack using the averaged TPR−FPR over 10
runs.
Upper / Lower bd MNIST Fashion-MNSIT CIFAR-10
ESA 27 / 0.00171 27 / 0.01306 71.4 / 0.00970
DPSGD 9.5 / 0.00166 9.5 / 0.01228 9 / 0.00957
Attribute fragmenting: Each of Tables IV, VIII, and IX
demonstrate how attribute fragmenting achieves close to op-
timal privacy/utility tradeoffs comparable to central DP algo-
rithms. The improvements on reconstructing the histogram as
εc values go up demonstrate that the optimality results hold
asymptotically and bounds arguing the guarantees of privacy
amplification could be tightened.
Report & Attribute fragmenting: Tables IV–IX demonstrate
that by combining report and attribute fragmenting, in a
variety of scenarios, we can achieve reasonable accuracy
while guaranteeing local and central privacy guarantees and
never producing highly-identifying individual reports (per-
report privacy ε`1 ’s are small).
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Data set # examples LDP boundper iteration Effective batch size
Accuracy in % (at central privacy bound)
εc =5 εc =10 εc =18
5000 (Rep. frag=1) 58.6 (± 1.9) 61.2 (± 1.3) 62.6 (± 0.7)
CIFAR-10 50000 ε`e =1.8 10000 (Rep. frag=2) 59.8 (± 1.2) 63.9 (± 0.5) 65.6 (± 0.3)
25000 (Rep. frag=5) 58.1 (± 0.8) 64 (± 0.7) 66.6 (± 0.4)
2000 (Rep. frag=1) 84.2 (±1.7) 88.9 (±1.3) 89.1 (±1)
MNIST 60000 ε`e =1.9 4000 (Rep. frag=2) 85.8 (±1.8) 92 (±0.8) 93 (±0.4)
10000 (Rep. frag=5) 80.5 (± 2.2) 91.2 (± 0.7) 93.9 (± 0.4)
2000 (Rep. frag=1) 71.1 (±0.7) 73.3 (±0.6) 74.5 (±0.4)
Fashion-MNIST 60000 ε`e =1.9 4000 (Rep. frag=2) 70.3 (±0.8) 74.3 (±0.4) 76.4 (±0.4)
10000 (Rep. frag=5) 67 (± 1.8) 73.3 (± 0.6) 76.1 (± 0.5)
TABLE XII: Privacy/utility tradeoff for various data sets. Here ε`e refers to LDP per report fragment, effective batch size
corresponds to the number of samples/batch × number of report fragments. The best known accuracy differentially private
training of CIFAR-10 models, with εc = 8 (and ε`e =∞) is 73% [42], for MNIST with εc = 3 (and ε`e =∞) is 98% [43],
and for Fashion-MNIST with εc = 3 (and ε`e =∞) is 86% [43]. All results are averaged over at least 10 runs.
C. Machine Learning in the ESA Framework
In this section we provide the empirical evidence of the
usefulness of the ESA framework in training machine learning
model (using variants of LDP-SGD) with both local and
central DP guarantees. In particular, we show that with per-
epoch local DP as small as ≈ 2, one can can achieve
close to state-of-the-art accuracy on benchmark data sets with
reasonable central differential privacy guarantees. We want
to emphasize that state-of-the-art results [42], [44], [43] we
compare against do not offer any local DP guarantees. We
consider three data sets, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-
10. We first describe the privacy budget accounting for central
differential privacy and then we state the empirical results.
We train our learning models using LDP-SGD, with the
modification that we train with randomly sub-sampled mini-
batches, rather than full-batch gradient as described in Al-
gorithm 5. The privacy accounting is done as follows. i)
Fix the ε`e per mini-batch gradient computation, ii) Amplify
the privacy via privacy amplification by shuffling using [14],
and iii) Use advanced composition over all the iterations
[33]. Because of the LDP randomness added in Algorithm 4
(LDP-SGD; client-side) of Section VI, Algorithm 5 (LDP-
SGD; server-side) typically requires large mini-batches. Due
to engineering considerations, we simulate large batches via
report fragmenting, as we do not envision the behavior to
be significantly different on a real mini-batch of the same
size.4 Formally, to simulate a batch size of m with a set
of s individual gradients, we report τ = m/s i.i.d. LDP
reports of the gradient from each respondent, with ε`e-local
differential privacy/report. (To distinguish it from actual batch
size, throughout this section we refer to it as effective batch
4Note that this is only to overcome engineering constraints; we do not need
group privacy accounting as this only simulates a larger implementation.
size. For privacy amplification by shuffling and sampling, we
consider batch size to be m.)
Layer Parameters
Convolution 16 filters of 8x8, strides 2
Max-Pooling 2x2
Convolution 32 filters of 4x4, strides 2
Max-Pooling 2x2
Fully connected 32 units
Softmax 10 units
TABLE XIII: Architecture for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
Layer Parameters
Conv × 2 32 filters of 3x3, strides 1
Max-Pooling 2x2
Conv × 2 64 filters of 3x3, strides 1
Max-Pooling 2x2
Conv × 2 128 filters of 3x3, strides 1
Fully connected 1024 units
Softmax 10 units
TABLE XIV: Architecture for CIFAR-10.
Implementation framework: To implement LDP-SGD, we
modify the DP-SGD algorithm in Tensorflow Privacy [44]
to include the new client-side noise generation algorithm
(Algorithm 4) and the privacy accountant.
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST Experiments: We train models
whose architecture is described in Table XIII. The results
on this dataset is summarized in Table XII. The non-private
accuracy baselines using this architecture are 99% and 89%
for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST respectively.
We reiterate that the privacy accounting after Shuffling
should be considered to be a loose upper bound. To test how
much higher the accuracy might reach without accounting
for central DP, we also plot the entire learning curve until
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it saturates (varying batch sizes) at LDP ε`e = 1.9 per epoch.
The accuracy tops out at 95% and 78% respectively.
CIFAR-10 Experiments: For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we con-
sider the model architecture in Table XIV following recent
work [42], [43]. Along the lines of work done in these papers,
we first train the model without privacy all but the last layer
on CIFAR-100 using the same architecture but replacing the
softmax layer with one having 100 units (for the 100 classes).
Next, we transfer all but the last layer to a new model and only
re-train the last layer with differential privacy on CIFAR-10.
Our non-private training baseline (of training on all layers)
achieves 86% accuracy. The results of this training method
are summarized in Table XII. As done with the MNIST
experiments, keeping in mind the looseness of the central DP
accounting, we also plot in Figure 2c the complete learning
curve up to saturation at LDP ε`e = 1.8 per epoch. We see
that the best achieved accuracy is 70%.
Note on central differential privacy: Since we are translating
local differential privacy guarantees to central differential
privacy guarantees, our notion of central differential privacy is
in the replacement model, i.e., two neighboring data sets of the
same size but differ by one record. However, the results in [42],
[44], [43] are in the add/removal model, i.e., two neighboring
data sets differ in the presence or absence of one data record.
As a blackbox, for any algorithm, εAdd/Remove ≤ εReplace ≤
2εAdd/Remove, and for commonly used algorithms, the upper
bound is close to tight.
Open question: We believe that the current accounting for
central differential privacy via advanced composition is poten-
tially loose, and one may get stronger guarantees via Re´nyi
differential privacy accounting (similar to that in [42]). We
leave the problem of tightening the overall central differential
privacy guarantee for future work.
Estimating lower bounds through membership inference
attacks: We use the membership inference attack to measure
the privacy leakage of a model [45], [46], [47], [48]. While
these measurements yield loose lower bounds on how much
information is leaked by a model, it can serve as an effective
comparison across models trained with noise subject to dif-
ferent privacy analyses (with their separate upper bounds on
differential privacy).
Along the lines of Yeom et al. [46], for each model, we
measure the average log-loss between true labels and predicted
outputs over a set of samples used in training and not in train-
ing. One measure of privacy leakage involves the best binary
(threshold) classifier based on these loss values to distinguish
between in-training and out-training examples. The resulting
ROC curve of the classifier across different thresholds can
be used to estimate a lower bound on the privacy parameter.
Specifically, it is easy to strengthen the results in Yeom et
al. [46] to show that the difference between the true positive
rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) at any threshold is
bound by 1−e−ε for a model satisfying ε-differential privacy.
Thus, the lower bound ε ≥ − log (max(TPR− FPR)). The
results are shown in Table XI for all models trained. As can
be seen from the results, even though the εc upper bound are
different for models trained under the ESA framework and
those with DPSGD, there is no much difference in the lower
bound.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper’s overall conclusion that it is feasible to im-
plement high-accuracy statistical reporting with strong central
privacy guarantees, as long as respondent’s randomized reports
are anonymized by a trustworthy intermediary. Sufficient for
this are a small set of primitives—applied within a relatively
simple, abstract attack model—for both analysis techniques
and practical technical mechanisms. Apart from anonymiza-
tion itself, the most critical of these primitives are those that
involve fragmenting of respondents’ randomized reports; first
explored in the original ESA paper [2], such fragmentation
turns out to be critical to achieving strong central privacy
guarantees with high utility, in our empirical applications
on real-world datasets. As we show here, those primitives
are sufficient to achieve high utility for difficult tasks such
as iterative training of deep-learning neural networks, while
providing both central and local guarantees of differential
privacy.
In addition, this paper makes it clear that when it comes
to practical applications of anonymous, differentially-private
reporting, significantly more exploration and empirical evalu-
ation is needed, along with more refined analysis. Specifically,
this need is made very clear by the discrepancy this paper
finds between the utility and central privacy guarantees of
anonymous one-hot-encoded LDP reports and anonymous
sketch-based LDP reports, witch sketching parameters drawn
from those used in real-world deployments. At the very least,
this discrepancy highlights how practitioners must carefully
choose the mechanisms they use in sketch-based encodings,
and the parameters by which they tune those mechanisms, in
order to achieve good tradeoffs for the dataset and task at hand.
However, the lack of precise central privacy guarantees for
anonymous sketch-based LDP reports also shows the pressing
needs for better sketch constructions and analyses that properly
account for the anonymity and fragmentation of respondents’
reports. While some recent work has started to look at better
analysis of sketching (e.g., asymptotically [19]), practitioners
should look towards the excellent tradeoffs shown here for
one-hot-encoded LDP reports, until further, more practical
results are derived in the large alphabet setting.
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APPENDIX
A. Missing details from Section III
Proof of Theorem III.1. To prove removal LDP we use the
reference distribution R0 to be randomized response with ε`
on the k-dimensional all-zeros vector 0. For any x ∈ D
(represented as one-hot binary vector in k dimensions), x
and 0 differ in one position and therefore, by standard prop-
erties of randomized response Algorithm att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR)
computing xˆ(j) := Rj(x(j), ε`) for j ∈ [k] satisfies removal
ε`-local differential privacy. Furthermore, each xˆ(j) by itself
is computed with (replacement) ε`-DP. We obtain the central
differential privacy guarantee (through amplification via shuf-
fling) by invoking Lemma II.6 with λ = 2n1+eε` .
The lower bound of 14 log(4/δ) for λ translates (with
some simplification) to an upper bound of ε` ≤ log n −
log(14 log(4/δ)) assumed in the Theorem statement. Fur-
thermore, as λ ≥ 14 log(2/δ) ≥ 8 log(2/δ), we have that
λ−√2λ log(2/δ) in Lemma II.6 is at least λ/2. Simplifying
the expression in (1), the central privacy guarantee for each
individual bit of any xˆ is:
εbitc ≤
√
64 log(4/δ)
λ
=
√
64(1 + eε`) log(4/δ)
2n
≤
√
64 · eε` log(4/δ)
n
. (2)
To prove removal central differential privacy for the entire
output we define the algorithm M′ : Dn × 2[n] as follows.
Given D = (x1, . . . , xn) and a set of indices I , M′ uses
the reference distribution R0 in place of the local randomizer
for each element xi for which i 6∈ I . Changing any x to
0 for the i-th element changes only one input bit. It follows
from Eq. (2) that the overall εc for removal central differential
privacy guarantee is εc =
√
64·eε` log(4/δ)
n , which completes
the proof.
Proof of Theorem III.2. In att-frag(Rk-RAPPOR) (Algorithm 1)
consider any x and the corresponding xˆ, the list of randomized
responses Rj(x(j), ε`). For brevity, consider the random vari-
able ζ =
(
eε`+1
eε`−1 · xˆ− 1eε`−1
)
. It follows that E [ζ] = x and
furthermore Var[ζ] = e
ε`+1
eε`−1 − 1 = Θ (1/eε`). Using standard
sub-Gaussian tail bounds, and taking an union bound over the
domain [k], one can show that w.p. at least 1− β, over all n
respondents with data xi,
α =
∥∥∥∥hˆ− 1n∑xi
∥∥∥∥
∞
= Θ
(√
log(k/β)
neε`
)
.
Applying Theorem III.1 to compute εc in terms of ε` com-
pletes the proof.
B. Missing details from Section IV
We start by analyzing the privacy of an arbitrary com-
bination of local DP randomizer followed by an arbitrary
differentially private algorithm. To simplify this analysis we
show that it suffices to restrict our attention to binary domains.
Lemma A.1. Assume that for every replacement (ε1, δ1)-DP
local randomizer Q1 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} and every replacement
(ε2, δ2)-DP local randomizer Q2 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} we have
thatQ2◦Q1 is a replacement (ε, δ)-DP local randomizer. Then
for every replacement (ε1, δ1)-DP local randomizerR1 : X →
Y and replacement (ε2, δ2)-DP local randomizer R2 : Y →
Z we have that R2 ◦ R1 is a replacement (ε, δ)-DP local
randomizer.
Proof. Let R1 : X → Y be a replacement (ε1, δ1)-local
randomizer and R2 : Y → Z be a replacement (ε2, δ2)-DP
randomizer. Assume for the sake of contradiction that for some
(ε, δ) there exists an event S ⊆ Z such that for some x, x′:
Pr[R2(R1(x)) ∈ S] > eεPr[R2(R1(x′)) ∈ S] + δ.
We will show that then there exist an (ε1, δ1)-DP local
randomizer Q1 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} and (ε2, δ2)-DP local ran-
domizer Q2 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} such that
Pr[Q2(Q1(0)) = 1] > eεPr[Q2(Q1(1)) = 1] + δ,
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contradicting the conditions of the lemma.
Let
y0 := arg min
y∈Y
{Pr[R2(y) ∈ S]},
y1 := arg max
y∈Y
{Pr[R2(y) ∈ S]}
and let
P1 := {y ∈ Y | Pr[R1(x) = y]− eεPr[R1(x′) = y] > 0}.
Using this definition and our assumption we get:
(Pr[R1(x) 6∈ P1]− eεPr[R1(x′) 6∈ P1]) ·Pr[R2(y0) ∈ S]
+ (Pr[R1(x) ∈ P1]− eεPr[R1(x′) ∈ P1]) ·Pr[R2(y1) ∈ S]
≥
∑
y∈Y
(Pr[R1(x) = y]− eεPr[R1(x′) = y]) ·Pr[R2(y) ∈ S]
> δ.
We now define Q1(0) := 1 (R1(x) ∈ P1) and Q1(1) :=
1 (R1(x′) ∈ P1), where 1 (·) denotes the indicator function.
By this definition Q1 is obtained from R1 by restricting
the set of inputs and postprocessing the output. Thus Q1 is
a replacement (ε1, δ1)-DP local randomizer. Next define for
b ∈ {0, 1}, Q2(b) := 1 (R2(yb) ∈ S). Again, it is easy to see
that Q2 is a replacement (ε2, δ2)-DP. We now obtain that
Pr[Q2(Q1(0)) = 1]− eεPr[Q2(Q1(1)) = 1]
=
∑
b∈{0,1}
(Pr[Q1(0) = b]− eεPr[Q1(1) = b]) ·Pr[Q2(b) = 1]
=
(
Pr[R1(x) 6∈ P1]− eεPr[R1(x′) 6∈ P1]
) ·Pr[R2(y0) ∈ S]
+
(
Pr[R1(x) ∈ P1]− eεPr[R1(x′) ∈ P1]
) ·Pr[R2(y1) ∈ S]
> δ
as needed for contradiction.
As an easy corollary of Lemma A.1 we obtain a tight upper
bound in the pure differential privacy case.
Corollary A.2. For every replacement ε1-DP local random-
izer R1 : X → Y and every replacement ε2-DP local ran-
domizer R2 : Y → Z we have that R2 ◦ R1 is a replacement
ε-DP local randomizer for ε = ln
(
eε1+ε2+1
eε1+eε2
)
. In addition, if
R1 is removal ε1-DP then R2 ◦ R1 is a removal ε-DP.
Proof. By Lemma A.1 it suffices to consider the case where
X = Y = Z = {0, 1}. Thus it suffices to upper bound the
expression:
Pr[R1(0) = 0] ·Pr[R2(0) = 1] +Pr[R1(0) = 1] ·Pr[R2(1) = 1]
Pr[R1(1) = 0] ·Pr[R2(0) = 1] +Pr[R1(1) = 1] ·Pr[R2(1) = 1] .
Denoting by p0 := Pr[R1(0) = 0], p1 := Pr[R1(1) = 0] and
α = Pr[R2(0) = 1]/Pr[R2(1) = 1] the expression becomes:
1 + (α− 1)p0
1 + (α− 1)p1 .
The conditions on R1 imply that p0p1 ,
1−p0
1−p1 ∈ [e−ε1 , eε1 ] and
α ∈ [e−ε2 , eε2 ]. Without loss of generality we can assume that
α ≥ 1 and thus the expression is maximized when α = eε2 and
p0 > p1. Maximizing the expression under these constraints
we obtain that the maximum is e
ε1+ε2+1
eε1+eε2 and is achieved when
p0 = 1− p1 = eε1/(1 + eε1). In particular, the claimed value
of ε is achieved by the standard binary randomized response
with ε1 and ε2.
To deal with the case of removal we can simply substitute
R1(x′) with the reference distribution R0 in the analysis to
obtain removal DP guarantees for R2 ◦ R1.
We remark that it is easy to see that e
ε1+ε2+1
eε1+eε2 ≤
min{eε1 , eε2}. Also in the regime where ε1, ε2 ≤ 1 we obtain
that ε = O(ε1ε2), namely the privacy is amplified by applying
local randomization.
Proof of Theorem IV.2. The proof of local differential privacy
is immediate based on Theorem IV.1. To obtain the central
differential privacy guarantee, we consider each of the terms
in the min expression for εc. From the central differential
privacy context, each of the shufflers in the execution of
Algorithm 2 can be considered to be a post-processing of
the output of a single shuffler, and the privacy guarantee
from this single shuffler should prevail. Each of the individual
reports are at most εb-locally differentially private, and hence
by using the generic privacy amplification by shuffling result
from Lemma II.5, the second term in the εc follows. To obtain
the first term, recall the matrix M(x) in Section IV. Each
row of the matrix satisfies ε0-local differential privacy, and
there are τ rows in this matrix. Hence, first applying privacy
amplification theorem from Lemma II.6 on each of the rows
independently, and then using advanced composition from
Theorem II.7 over the τ rows, we obtain the first term in εc,
which completes the proof of the central differential privacy
guarantee.
The utility guarantee follows immediately from the utility
proof of Theorem III.2.
C. Missing Details from Section V
Proof of Theorem V.1. The proof follows a similar argument
as [49, Theorem 3.5]. Consider two neighboring data sets D
and D′, there are only two crowd IDs whose counts get af-
fected. Since the randomization for each of the counts are done
independently, we can analyze their privacy independently and
then perform standard composition [34]. Consider a crowd Di,
and the corresponding counts ni 6= n′i on data sets D and D′
respectively.
Notice that the computation of nˆi satisfies
εcr`
2 -differential
privacy by the Laplace mechanism [23]. Now, by the tail
probability of Laplace noise, with probability at least 1− δcr2 ,
the algorithm does not abort on crowd Di. In that case, the
shuffler can ensure nˆi records in Di via dropping records. This
would ensure
(
εcr`
2 ,
δcr
2
)
-differential privacy.
Therefore, composing the above over the two crowds that
are affected by D and D′, we complete the proof.
Proof of Theorem V.2. The proof of this theorem follows from
standard tail probabilities of the Laplace mechanism. With
probability at least 1 − δcr, for a given crowd Di, the error
in the reported count is at most 2T = 4εcr` log
(
4
δcr
)
. Taking an
union bound over all the ξ crowds, completes the proof.
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D. Missing Details from Section VI
Proof of Theorem VI.1. We will prove the privacy and utility
guarantees separately.
Privacy guarantee: We will prove this guarantee in two steps:
(i) Amplify the local differential privacy guarantee ε` per
epoch via [29, Corollary 5.3.1] (see Theorem A.3), and (ii) Use
advanced composition [49] to account for the privacy budget.
Combination of these two immediately implies the theorem.
Theorem A.3 (Corollary 5.1 from [29]). Let R : X → Y be
an ε`e-local differentially private randomizer, and M be the
corresponding shuffled mechanism (that shuffles all the locally
randomized reports). If ε`e ≤ log(n)/4, then M satisfies(
O
(
(eε`e−1)
√
log(1/δ)√
n
)
, δ
)
-central differential privacy in
the shuffled setting.
Utility guarantee: Here we use the a standard bound on the
convergence of Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) stated in
Theorem A.4. One can instantiate Theorem A.4 in the context
of this paper as follows: F (θ) = 1n
n∑
i=1
`(θ;xi), and gt is the
randomized gradient computed in Algorithm 5.
Theorem A.4 (Theorem 2 from [50]). Consider a convex func-
tion F : C → R defined over a convex set C ⊆ Rd, and con-
sider the following SGD algorithm: θt+1 ← ΠC
(
θt − c√tgt
)
,
where ΠC (·) is the `2-projection operator onto the set C, c > 0
is a constant, and gt has the following properties. i) [Un-
biasedness] E[gt] = 5F (θt), and ii) [Bounded Variance]
E
[‖gt‖22] = G2. The following is true for any T > 1.
E[F (θt)]−min
θ∈C
F (θ) ≤
(‖C‖22
c
+ cG2
)
2 + log T√
T
.
Following the instantiation above, by the property
of the noise distribution, one can easily show that
E[gt] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
5`(θt;xi), and furthermore E[‖gt‖2] =
O
(
L
√
d√
n
· eε`e+1eε`e−1
)
= G. (See [17, Appendix I.2] for the full
derivation. Setting c = ‖C‖2G , and setting T = n/ log
2 n
completes the proof.
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